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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Besides those parties listed in the caption, petitioner Frank Osborne
("Osborne") purported to direct his petition for writ of mandamus to all district courts in
the state of Utah, even though no district court had taken or refused to take any action he
sought to compel or correct.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS
COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

vi

STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED

1

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A.

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in
Lower Courts
3

B.

Statement of Facts

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

14

I.

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS
IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED BECAUSE THERE IS NO ONE
AGAINST WHOM MANDAMUS RELIEF CAN ISSUE
14
A.

When Reviewing the Court of Appeals' Decision, This Court
Must Examine Whether Mandamus Relief
Was Appropriate
14

B.

Mandamus Relief Is Available Only To Compel Certain
Actions Or To Correct A Gross Abuse of Discretion

C.
II.

15

Mandamus Relief Was Not Available to Osborne In the Court
of Appeals
16

OSBORNE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS RIGHTS AND IS NOT
ENTITLED TO FURTHER DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS . 18
iii

A.

Lehr v. Robertson Establishes the Analytical Framework for
Determining the Nature of Osborne's Rights
19

B.

Utah Law Governs the Issue of Whether Osborne Established
His Right to Constitutional Protections
23

C.

Osborne Did Not Establish His Rights Under Utah Law .. 26
1.

Strict Compliance With the Putative Father Provisions
Is Required to Establish Rights
26

2.

Osborne Failed to Establish His Rights

3.

The Unknowing Nonresident Putative Father
Provisions Do Not Apply to Osborne And, In Any
Event, He Did Not Comply With Them
30

29

D.

Osborne Is Not Entitled to Due Process Safeguards Because
He Did Not Establish Rights to the Child
32

E.

The Utah Putative Father Provisions Are Constitutional on
Their Face and as Applied
33

NO COURT HAS EVER RECOGNIZED A RIGHT TO SEEK
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF WITHOUT CONSENTING TO
PERSONAL JURISDICTION, AND NO SUCH RIGHT
EXISTS
35
THE UTAH COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO FINALIZE THE
ADOPTION
37
A.

Utah Courts Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction

B.

If Personal Jurisdiction Is Required Over a Putative Father
Who Has Failed to Establish Rights, the Status Exception to
Minimum Contacts Protects the Interests of Children Placed
for Adoption
39

IV

37

V.

IF THIS COURT SIDES WITH OSBORNE, INTERSTATE
ADOPTIONS WILL CEASE AND THOUSANDS OF
FINALIZED ADOPTIONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO
CHALLENGE

43

CONCLUSION

45

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

46

ADDENDUM

47
1

Statutory Provisions

2

District Court Record

3

Utah Court of Appeals Order dated July 2,2002

4

Fourth Judicial District Court Order Regarding Birth
Father's Rights dated April 8, 2002

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
A.E.H. v. C.C., 468 N.W.2d 190 (Wis.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 925 (1991)

41

Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938)

35, 37

Angell v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 656 P.2d 405 (Utah 1982)

16

Archer v. Utah State Land Bd, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 622 (1964)

16

B.G. v. H.S., 509 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)

23

Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So. 2d 561, 563 & n.l (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

41

Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001)

41

Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988)

43

Burns v. Crenshaw, 84 Or. App. 257, 733 P.2d 922 (1987)

24, 25

Burton v. Exam Center Ind. & Gen. Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261.. 37
Davidson v. Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 556 (Wise. Ct. App. 1992)

41

Ellis v. Social Servs. Dept, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980)

33

Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948)

40

Garcia v. Jones, 29 Utah 2d 409, 510 P.2d 1099 (1973)

16

Genoe v. Genoe, 500 A.2d 3 (N.J. App. 1985)

41

Glanzner v. State Dep't of Social Servs., 835 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)

41

Harris v. Harris, 410 S.E.2d 527 (N.C Ct. App. 1991)

41

Hudson v. Hudson, 670 P.2d 287 (Wash. App. 1983)

41

In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, 984 P.2d 967

17, 26-30, 33

vi

In re Adoption ofBaby Boy D, 769 A.2d 508 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2001)

25

In re Adoption ofBaby Boy S, 32 Kan. App. 2d 119, 912 P.2d 761 (1996)

23

In re Adoption ofC.L. W., 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

23

In re Adoption ofCopeland, 43 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), appeal denied
April 16,2001
In re Adoption ofHalloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986)

41
39

In re Adoption ofJ.L.K, 737 P.2d 915 (Okla. 1987)

24,42

In re Adoption ofMM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982)

24, 25

In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

26, 33

In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 543 P.2d 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975)
In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248,435 S.E.2d 352 (1993)

41
22, 24,42

In re Dean, 447 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1984)

42

In re Female Infant F, 594 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1993)

25

In re John Doe, 926 P.2d 1290, 1299 (Haw. 1996)

41

In reM.L.K., 768 P.2d 316 (Kan. App. 1984)

41

In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E. 2d 107 (Ind. App. 1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S.
1202 (1983)
41
In re Marriage ofLeonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443 (Cal. App. 1981)

41

In re Marriage ofMobley, 569 N.E.2d 323 (111. App. Ct. 1991)

41

In re Petition to Adopt C.M.A., 557 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)

23

In reS.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992)
In re Vernon R. V., 991 P.2d 986 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999)

vii

41
41

In re Williams, 563 S.E.2d 202 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)

22

Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982)
19, 21, 32, 35, 36
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945)

19

Joliffv. Miff, 829 P.2d 34, 36 n.5 (Okl. 1992)

41

Kulko v. Superior Ct, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)

22

Lassiterv. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981)

22

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) . 19, 20, 21,22, 23, 28, 32, 36
Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331 (Utah 1980)

16

Martinez v. Reed, 490 So. 2d 303 (La. Ct. App. 1986)

41

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953)

22,42

Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)

40

McAtee v. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d 611 (W. Va. 1984)

41

Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning & Zoning Comm 'n, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983)
16
Milliken v. Meyer ,311 U.S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339 (1940)

19

Pasqualone v. Pasqulone, 406 N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio 1980)

42

People ex rel. State of Wyoming ex rel. Watson v. Stout, 969 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1998)
41
Phillips v. Thornfelt, 1986 Ky. App. Lexis 1116 (Kentucky Ct. App. 1986) (unpublished)
41
Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405,409 (R.I. 1981)

41

Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 13 S.E.2d 224 (1941)

31

viii

Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995)

2,14,15

Roderick v. Roderick, 776 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)

41

Rosero v. Blake, 563 S.E.2d 248 (N.C. Ct. App.), writ allowed, 356 N.C. 166, 568
S.E.2d 610 (2002)
31, 34
Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984)

34

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982)

22

Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)

40

State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37,46 P.3d 230

2, 14

State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216,429 P.2d 969 (1967)

15

State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

16

State in the Interest of W.A., 2002 UT App. 72, cert, granted sub nom., In re W.A.,
48 P.3d 979 (Utah 2002) (Table)

23, 39,40

Stubbs v. Weathersby, 126 Or. App. 596, 869 P.2d 893 (1994)
Thompson v. Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)

24, 25
41

Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1983)
33,43,44
Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086 (Mont. 1979), cert, denied, AAA U.S. 1071 (1980) ..
41
White v. Blake, 859 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App. 1993)

41

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)

40

ix

STATUTES
North Carolina Code Ann. § 48-2-100

26,38

North Carolina Code Ann. § 48-3-603(a)(l)

29

North Carolina Code Ann. § 49-10

6

North Carolina Code Ann. 49-12.1

5, 6, 31, 34

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV

1, 9, 19, 23, 32

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(a)

43

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(b)

44

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(c)

44

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(c)

44

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13

3, 8

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)

10, 27, 36

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b), (4) and (5)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5)

9, 28, 32

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4)

3,10, 30, 32

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4)(c)

30

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4)(d)

30

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.22

6

x

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.24

8,17-18

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-7(1)

37

Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1

8

Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2

8

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a

27

Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7

1, 36

Utah Constitution, Article I, § 11

1, 36, 37

Utah Constitution, Article I, § 24

37

OTHER AUTHORITY
34 Am. Jur. Mandamus §4

15

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 78 (1971)

38

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 289 (1971)

23

Utah R. App. P. 49

1

Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)

1

Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)

3

Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)

15

Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)

15

Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and PersonalJurisdiction, 1995 U. 111.
L. Rev. 813
22, 23

xi

STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3). Respondent Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.
("Adoption Center"), however, questions whether the Court of Appeals properly had
before it any issue that could have been remedied by issuance of a writ of mandamus.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[o]nly the
questions set forth in the petition [for writ of certiorari] or fairly included therein will be
considered by the Supreme Court." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). It is not at all clear that
the questions set forth in Osborne's brief are the same questions in his petition for writ of
certiorari. The questions he listed in his petition for writ of certiorari are:
1.
Does Utah have the power, under its Adoption
Code (U.C.A. Title 78, Chapter 30), and notwithstanding
requirements of Amendment XIV of the United States
Constitution, to exercise in personam jurisdiction over and
apply its law to a nonresident natural father whose child is
placed for adoption in Utah, when there is no independent
basis for exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the father?
2.
May a nonresident natural father whose child is
placed for adoption in Utah be forced to waive a defense
based upon lack of in personam jurisdiction if he brings a
challenge to in personam jurisdiction in a Utah court, and
would such a waiver constitute a violation of Article I,
Section 7 and Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution,
or Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3. Pursuant to Rule 49(a)(4), these questions should
prevail over any inconsistent issues stated in Osborne's brief.

1

Yet, these questions are also a spin removed from the relief he sought in the
Court of Appeals. He sought a writ of mandamus, purportedly directed to every district
court in Utah, ordering that he be allowed to appear in a Utah court to challenge the
adoption without waiving his defense that Utah has no personal jurisdiction over him.
Original Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Temporary Restraining Order ("Mand.
Pet.") at 1. How this Court views the issues Osborne presents is limited by the type of
relief he sought in the Court of Appeals.
Osborne also does not fully state the standard of review, claiming that the
standard is simply "correction of error." Pet. Br. at 1, 2. He cites no authority. On
certiorari, this Court does review the decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness,
but the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision turns on whether that court
accurately performed its functions. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, \ 6, 46 P.3d 230, 232
("correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review"). Thus, this
Court also must determine whether mandamus relief was appropriate. The Court of
Appeals had to "look at the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the
petition, and the purpose of the type of writ sought in deciding whether to grant
extraordinary relief." Renn v. Utah State Bd. ofPardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995)
(emphasis added).

2

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Controlling statutory provisions, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.12,
78-30-4.13, 78-30-4.14(2)(b), (4), and (5), and 78-30-4.15(4), are reproduced in
Addendum 1, along with selected provisions of North Carolina law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in
Lower Courts.

Contrary to an assumption this Court appears to have made since Osborne
first sought relief in this Court, this began as an original proceeding in the Court of
Appeals because Osborne did not appeal rulings of the district court concerning his rights
to the child at issue. He commenced a proceeding in Fourth District Court in Utah
County on February 14, 2002, to challenge the district court's subject matter jurisdiction
over any adoption proceedings, but when that court ruled on March 18, 2002, that he had
waived any notice and consent rights he may have in any adoption proceedings
concerning the child, Osborne voluntarily dismissed that action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 12-39, 141-46, 147-48.1
Osborne then filed an action in federal court on or about April 5, 2002,
arguing that he has a constitutional right to challenge the adoption without a Utah court
exercising personal jurisdiction over him. That was the first time Osborne raised his
1U

R." refers to pages from the district court record. Many pages of the district
court record are attached as Addendum 2 to this brief. The confusion engendered by the
procedures Osborne has followed is evident from the fact this Court requested a record
from the district court, even though this began as an original proceeding in the Court of
Appeals.
3

personal jurisdiction argument directly in any court, and it was in federal district court
On June 21,2002, the federal court refused to grant temporary injunctive relief, and
within hours Osborne filed an original proceeding in the Utah Court of Appeals—not a
federal court of appeals—seeking a writ of mandamus and temporary restraining order.2
Osborne argued in the Court of Appeals that he has a constitutional right to
challenge the adoption without the Utah court exercising personal jurisdiction over him.
On July 2, 2002, the Court of Appeals looked past the question of whether mandamus
relief would even be appropriate under the circumstances and went directly to the merits,
flatly rejecting Osborne's request and ruling that Osborne had waived his rights to the
child at issue and that his personal jurisdiction argument is meritless. Add. 3. Osborne
filed his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court on August 1, 2002, and this Court
granted his petition on September 11, 2002.
B.

Statement of Facts.

Adoption Center is a licensed child placing agency with its principal
offices in Orem, Utah. R. 77. The child that is the subject of this case was born in Utah
on August 6, 2001. R. 37, Tf 11. The mother, who was from North Carolina, had
contacted an adoption agency in Utah previous to the birth of the child, and came to Utah
to give birth and place the child for adoption. R. 37-38, \ \ 9-11. The mother was

Apparently, Osborne's lawyers were also confused as the Court of Appeals' file
shows that the check for the filing fee was made out to the US Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
4

married to someone other than Osborne at the time of conception and birth, and the child
was given the surname of the birth mother's husband. R. 70, 72.
Osborne knew that the mother had made contact with a Utah adoption
agency and that she had come to Utah with the intent to give birth and place the child for
adoption. Mand. Pet. at 4; R. 37-38,ffij9, 10. After the child's birth, however, the
mother initially decided not to place the child for adoption and returned to North
Carolina. Mand. Pet. at 4; R. 37, ^ 11-12. She lived with her mother for a week, then
apparently lived with Osborne until no later than December 10, 2001—for a little more
than three months—when she moved out.3 Mand. Pet. at 4-5; R. 36, ^j 20.
Significantly, while Osbome claims the child developed a bonding
relationship with the mother's other son D J., nowhere in the district court or the Court of
Appeals did he claim that the child developed a bonding relationship with him. See
Mand. Pet. at 5; R. 37,fflf15-16. Also, during the three months the mother lived with
Osborne, he claims he tried on two different occasions to get her to execute a voluntary
declaration of paternity with him, but she would not do so. R. 36, ^j 18. Even with her
refusals to execute a voluntary declaration of paternity, Osbome did not file paternity or
legitimation proceedings in North Carolina.4
3

The mother did not live with Osbome for five months as he claims. The child
was not even five months old when he was placed for adoption by his mother.
4

Under North Carolina law, a person, other than the woman's husband, claiming
to be the father of a child born to a married woman must file legitimation proceedings
and prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence to be legally recognized as the
child's father. N.C. Code Ann. § 49-12.1. In this case, we have nothing but Osborne's
word that he is the father.
5

In early January, 2002, the mother again informed Osborne that she was
going to Utah to place the child for adoption.5 Mand. Pet. at 6; R. 36, Tf 23. The mother
returned to Utah and on January 4,2002—at least 25 days after the mother had ceased
living with Osborne—relinquished her parental rights to the child to Adoption Center so
that he could be placed for adoption. R. 74-75, ^ 24. At that time, the child was just
under five months old. R. 37, <|j 11; R. 35 % 25. The mother's husband also signed a
relinquishment and consent to adoption on January 15, 2002. R. 69-70. Adoption
Center placed the minor child for adoption with Mr. and Mrs. S. R. 35, ^ 27. Pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.22, however, Adoption Center has legal custody of and is
responsible for the minor child until his adoption is finalized.
Not until February 11, 2002—more than one month after he was informed
that the mother and her husband had placed the child for adoption in Utah—did Osborne
commence a paternity and custody action in North Carolina.6 R. 35, ^f 30. Osborne also

5

Osborne filed a motion in the Court of Appeals to supplement the record with
information purporting to show he did not know the mother had returned to Utah until
after she had relinquished the child. Petitioner's Appendix ("Pet. App.") 36. While
these facts do not change the outcome, Adoption Center opposed the motion and the
Court of Appeals never ruled on it before that court rejected Osborne's petition. There
have been no findings by a district court on this issue.
6

This proceeding, however, is not a proper legitimation proceeding under North
Carolina law because he only named the natural mother as a party and did not name the
mother's spouse or the child as required by N.C. Code Ann. §§ 49-12.1 and 49-10. He
also has not sought the appointment of a guardian ad litem as required by § 49-12.1.
Thus, the outcome of this action cannot be a finding that he is the legal father of the
child.
6

has never filed a paternity action in Utah or a notice of any paternity action with the Utah
State Registrar of Vital Statistics. R. 67.
On February 14, 2002, Osborne filed a Verified Petition Challenging
Subject Matter Jurisdiction ("Verified Petition") in Fourth District Court challenging the
district court's subject matter jurisdiction over any proceeding regarding the adoption or
custody of the child. R. 12-39. In the Verified Petition, Osborne did not raise the
personal jurisdiction issues he now raises in this Court.
On February 20, 2002, Osborne issued a subpoena to Adoption Center
commanding Adoption Center to reveal: (1) the name and address of the adoptive
parents, (2) the attorneys involved in the adoption proceeding, and (3) the county in
which the adoption proceeding was filed and the names of all judges who have issued
any rulings or orders in the adoption case. R. 57-58. On February 26, 2002, Adoption
Center filed a motion to quash the subpoena, R. 65-66, arguing that Osborne had waived
his notice and consent rights under Utah law regarding any adoption. R. 81-85.
On March 1, 2002, at Osborne's request, the district court heard Adoption
Center's motion to quash. Osborne's lawyer appeared and presented argument, and
thereafter filed two supplemental memoranda, arguing that the district court had no in
personam jurisdiction to rule on his rights. R. 102-05, 136-40. In the second
memorandum, Osborne stated that "[i]f this Court rejects Mr. Osborne's subject matter
jurisdiction argument, he fully intends to challenge this Court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over him." R. 137.

7

On March 18,2002, the Fourth District Court granted Adoption Center's
motion to quash. R. 141-46. That court held that "Frank Osborne has not complied with
the legal requirements for preserving his parental rights under Utah law." R. 144. It also
held that "Osborne has failed to take any action according to the statutory requirements,
and so has waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise had." R. 144.
Osborne did not appeal this ruling, or even make good on his threat to
further challenge the district court's in personam jurisdiction. Rather, on
March 27, 2002, Osborne filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the action. R. 147-48.
On March 8,2002, Adoption Center filed a separate Petition for
Determination of Birth Father's Rights relating to the child. Pet. App. 20. This petition
for determination was filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.24, which is part of
the Utah adoption code and states that "[a]ny interested party may petition the court for a
determination of the rights and interests of any person who may claim an interest in a
child under this chapter." That petition was also filed pursuant to Utah's Declaratory
Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 and 78-33-2.
Because the district court ruled in the action brought by Osborne he had
waived his rights to notice and consent, Adoption Center filed a motion to allow its
petition to be heard without notice to Osborne.7 See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13. Pet.
7

When Adoption Center filed this petition, the district court had not yet ruled that
Osborne had waived his notice and consent rights, so Adoption Center sent a copy of the
petition for a determination of birth father's rights to Osborne's lawyer, along with a
notice of the petition and an acceptance of service. See Pet. App. 21. Osborne's lawyer
refused to accept service of this petition, but by so doing acknowledged that he had
actual notice of the petition. Pet. App. 22. Shortly thereafter, the district court entered
8

App. 24. On or about March 29,2002, the district court granted Adoption Center's
motion to proceed without notice, Pet. App. 29, and on or about April 8,2002, the
district court entered an order finding that any person claiming to be the putative father
of the child, including Frank Osborne, "is deemed to have waived and surrendered any
right in relation to the minor child, including the right to notice of any judicial
proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption
of the child is not required." Pet. App. 31; Add. 4. This language essentially tracks Utah
Code Ann. §78-30-4.14(5).
Following his voluntary dismissal of his state court petition, Osborne filed
a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging
violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Pet. App. 32. Among other
things, Osborne asked the federal court for injunctive relief to stay the state court
adoption and determination of birth father rights proceedings. Id.fflf32-34. On
June 4, 2002, Adoption Center filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in the
federal action, and as part of that filing included a copy of the state district court's
April 8, 2002 ruling on Osborne's rights.8 Mand. Pet. at 11-12.

its decision on the motion to quash and ruled that Osborne had waived his notice and
consent rights regarding the adoption of the child. R. 141-46.
8

Osborne has made no effort in the state courts, including this Court, to have that
ruling concerning Osborne's rights vacated, overruled, or otherwise changed. Osborne's
petition for writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals only asked that he be able to raise
his personal jurisdiction defense. Mand. Pet. at 1-3.
9

On June 18,2002, Osborne asked the federal court for a temporary
restraining order to enjoin Adoption Center and the adoptive parents from finalizing the
adoption. Pet. App. 34. At a hearing held June 21,2002, the federal court refused to
grant Osborne's motion for a temporary restraining order. Mand. Pet. at 12. Osborne
filed his Mandamus Petition in the Court of Appeals that same day.9
On July 2,2002, the Court of Appeals denied Osborne's petition. The
Court of Appeals ruled that "Petitioner has failed to establish he has met any of the[]
requirements" of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) to establish any rights to the child.
Add. 3. It also ruled that Osborne failed to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4.15(4), which deal with non-resident birth fathers, because "he took absolutely
no legal action in his home state of North Carolina for the five months prior to the
mother's relinquishment." Add. 3 at 2. The Court of Appeals concluded that "Petitioner
has simply failed to take any timely action to preserve his rights to this child." Id.
The Court of Appeals also addressed Osborne's jurisdiction argument and
found it to be without merit. It wrote:
Regarding Petitioner's jurisdictional argument, the
question of personal jurisdiction only arises when a defendant
is called to defend an action in court. The district court did
not need or attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction over
Petitioner. He lost his rights to the child by operation of law
when he failed to take the statutory steps required to protect
his rights. Furthermore, it is Petitioner, as a plaintiff, seeking
relief in Utah courts who has invoked the jurisdiction of the
Utah courts. The fact that court action, and the operation of
9

The Court of Appeals' file shows that Osborne's check for the filing fee was
made out to the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
10

law, affected the father's unprotected rights does not
implicate personal jurisdiction. If Petitioner wants to protect
and assert his rights in a child relinquished for adoption in
Utah, he must take the necessary action to protect his rights
under Utah law. He cannot simply stand on the "sidelines"
and claim that Utah courts lack jurisdiction over him.
Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted).
Just prior to the ruling by the Court of Appeals, Osborne amended his
paternity action in North Carolina to include Adoption Center and the adoptive parents as
parties. Before the time for either to answer had passed, Osborne obtained first an ex
parte temporary restraining order, and second an ex parte preliminary injunction. Pet.
App. 37, 41. Both Adoption Center and the adoptive parents have moved to dismiss the
claims pending against them in North Carolina for lack of personal jurisdiction.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted because
there is no one against whom mandamus relief can issue. Osborne never asked a state
district court to allow him to challenge the adoption without waiving personal
jurisdiction. That question was only addressed to the federal district court prior to the
commencement of the mandamus action in the Court of Appeals. As such, no one did
anything or refused to do anything that the Court of Appeals could correct or compel.
In any event, Osborne did not take appropriate steps under Utah law to
establish his rights to the child. No one knows if he is even the father. Utah law applies
when determining his rights because the adoption is pending here. Osborne did not file
the necessary paternity action or notice of that action in Utah or take any action in North
11

Carolina prior to the relinquishment of the child by the mother and her husband, the legal
father under North Carolina law. As such, he established norightsin the child.
Under settled United States Supreme Court precedent, therefore, Osborne
is not entitled to due process protections in conjunction with the adoption because,
having failed to establish hisrights,he is a nonparty to the adoption. The personal
jurisdiction requirement derivesfromthe due process clause, and is an individual liberty
interest that can be waived and that does not restrict the sovereign power of a court.
Because personal jurisdiction is a due process protection, Osborne is not in a position to
demand that a Utah court have personal jurisdiction over him to finalize the adoption
because he is not a party to the adoption, having failed to establish rights to the child.
In any event, no court has ever recognized a right for someone to seek
affirmative relief in a court without consenting to the personal jurisdiction of that court.
In fact, it is settled law that seeking affirmative relief from a court means that one
consents to the jurisdiction of that court. Utah is not required by the federal or state
constitution to hold otherwise, and Utah is not required by the open courts provision of
the Utah Constitution to create such a remedy. The open courts provision does not
require the creation of new remedies. Thus, if Osborne desires to challenge the adoption
in Utah, he will have to consent to jurisdiction.
If personal jurisdiction over Osborne is required to finalize the adoption,
the Utah court will have personal jurisdiction over him either because Osborne will
consent to jurisdiction or under the status exception to minimum contacts. Utah is the
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only place where a court will have subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption because
the adoptive parents live in Utah. The United States Supreme Court has recognized an
exception to minimum contacts when a state is adjudicating the status of a person within
its jurisdiction. This status exception is well established and has been recognized in
divorce, termination, custody, and adoption cases. Thus, a Utah court will have
jurisdiction sufficient tofinalizethe adoption even absent minimum contacts by Osborne.
Finally, a ruling for Osborne would be a disaster-in-the-making. By ruling
that personal jurisdiction is required over every nonresident putative father who has not
established his rights to a child and that the status exception to minimum contacts does
not apply, interstate adoptions in Utah would be brought to a standstill and thousands of
alreadyfinalizedadoptions would be open to question. A judgment entered without
personal jurisdiction where personal jurisdiction is required is null and void. Thus, no
one will want tofinalizean adoption in Utah if any putative father is a nonresident, even
if that putative father has failed to protect his rights. And, if adoption decrees are not
binding as to a nonresident putative father, any adoption decree already entered involving
such a putative father would no longer be final and would become subject to challenge.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS
IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED BECAUSE THERE IS NO ONE
AGAINST WHOM MANDAMUS RELIEF CAN ISSUE.
Osborne asked the Court of Appeals to order that he be allowed to either

intervene in or challenge the adoption of the child without waiving his defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction. Mand. Pet. at 1. His petition was directed to every district court in
the state. Mand. Pet. at 1. Osborne did not, however, first present the issue to a district
court and, therefore, mandamus relief is not available to him.10
A.

When Reviewing the Court of Appeals' Decision, This Court
Must Examine Whether Mandamus Relief Was Appropriate,

On certiorari, the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision turns on
whether that court accurately performed its functions. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ^ 6,
46 P.3d 230, 232 ("[Correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of
review."). In other words, the question here is still whether Osborne is entitled to
mandamus relief. In determining whether to grant mandamus, the Court of Appeals was
supposed to "look at the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the
petition, and the purpose of the type of writ sought in deciding whether to grant
extraordinary relief." Renn v. Utah State Bd. ofPardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995)
I0

On Adoption Center's motion to quash, Osborne argued that the district court
did not have personal jurisdiction to rule on Osborne's rights. Pet. App. 14, 16. But, he
never argued that he had a right to intervene in or challenge the adoption without
consenting to personal jurisdiction. In any event, he voluntarily dismissed the district
court action and has never challenged that Court's ruling concerning his rights.
14

(emphasis added). Had it done so, it would have realized that mandamus relief was not
appropriate.
B.

Mandamus Relief Is Available Only To Compel Certain Actions
Or To Correct A Gross Abuse of Discretion.

Rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs
extraordinary writs seeking mandamus relief, provides that:
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior
court... has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion; (B) where an inferior court... has failed to
perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or
station; [or] (C) where an inferior court... has refused the
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to
which the petitioner is entitled . . . .
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d) (emphasis added).
The parameters of mandamus relief have been further defined by case law.
'The common law writ of mandamus was designed to compel a person to perform a legal
duty incumbent on him by virtue of his office or as required by law." Renn, 904 P.2d
at 682. "The writ was initially available to compel the performance of a nondiscretionary
duty and to '"compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion,
but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way.'" Id. (quoting
State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 218,429 P.2d 969, 970 (1967) (which quoted 34 Am.
Jur. Mandamus § 4)). "In modern times, that writ has also been expanded so that it can
be used to correct gross abuses of discretion." Renn, 904 P.2d at 682. In any event,
"extraordinary writs are available only when there is no 'plain, speedy and adequate
remedy' at law." Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)).
15

C.

Mandamus Relief Was Not Available to Osborne In the Court of
Appeals.

It is difficult to see how any of the purposes for a writ of mandamus would
serve Osborne's needs. His request was directed against all district courts in the state,
Mand. Pet. at 1, but no district court resisted or refused Osborne's request to intervene in
or challenge the adoption without waiving personal jurisdiction because he did not raise
the issue with any of them. He only raised the issue in federal court. Before the Court of
Appeals could compel a district court to allow Osborne to so intervene or challenge the
adoption, the district court would have had to refuse to let him do so. See AngelI v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court, 656 P.2d 405, 407 (Utah 1982) (mandamus available to correct
district court's refusal to transfer venue where plaintiff was clearly entitled to transfer);
Garcia v. Jones, 29 Utah 2d 409, 411,510 P.2d 1099, 1100 (1973) ("To be entitled to
the issuance of the writ, petitioner had to prove that the State Division of Family Services
had a clear statutory duty to perform certain acts and refused to do so." (Emphasis
added)); Archerv. Utah State Land Bd.9 15 Utah 2d 321, 323, 392 P.2d 622, 623 (1964)
(mandamus available where "administrative board or officer has a clear statutory duty to
perform a certain act and it or he refuses to do so." (Emphasis added)). See also
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning & Zoning Comm yn, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah
1983) (mandamus not available because plaintiff bypassed available administrative
remedies); Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331, 333 (Utah 1980) (same as Merrihew);
State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 920-21 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (district court must first
exceed its jurisdiction or grossly abuse its discretion before mandamus is available).
16

Because Osborne did not present the issue first to a district court, there was
nothing for the Court of Appeals to compel or correct. Nowhere has Osborne
demonstrated that a district court exceeded its jurisdiction or committed a gross abuse of
discretion. No district court has failed to perform a nondiscretionary function, no district
court has refused to exercise discretion, and no district court has committed a gross abuse
of discretion that the Court of Appeals could have compelled or corrected through
issuance of a writ of mandamus. The only court that refused Osborne any relief was the
federal district court, yet the Utah Court of Appeals has no power over the federal court.
Mandamus relief simply is not appropriate or available in this case.
Osborne also did not demonstrate that he had no plain, speedy, or adequate
remedy at law. He undoubtedly will argue that he could not have intervened in or
challenged the adoption in district court without waiving his personal jurisdiction
defense or that he did not know where the adoption was filed. He points to In re B.B.D.,
1999 UT 70, 984 P.2d 967, as the reason why he could not raise the issue in district
court. The birth father in that case was found to have waived his personal jurisdiction
defense when he "voluntarily invoked and submitted to the jurisdiction of Utah." Id.
Tf 28, 984 P.2d at 973. B.B.D., however, does not say whether the putative father raised
the personal jurisdiction question in district court. Thus, we do not know what the
outcome would have been if Osborne had tried to raise the issue in district court.
Osborne had a chance to raise the issue with the district court in the action
he filed there, but he did not do so. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.24 ("[a]ny interested
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party may petition the court for a determination of the rights and interests of any person
who may claim an interest in a child under this chapter....")• He did argue that the
district court did not have jurisdiction over him to determine his rights. Pet. App. 14, 16.
Yet, he did not assert there the right that he asserts now, and he dismissed that action
after the district court ruled he had waived his rights to the child. R. 147-48. He did not
appeal that ruling, but ran to federal court. As a result, the Court of Appeals had no state
court judge to whom it could direct a writ of mandamus. The writ of certiorari to the
Court of Appeals should be dismissed, or the Court of Appeals should be instructed to
dismiss the Mandamus Petition.
II.

OSBORNE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS RIGHTS AND IS NOT
ENTITLED TO FURTHER DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS.
Osborne assumes for purposes of his entire brief that he is in no different

position than a father who has fully developed parental rights. This key assumption,
however, is not true. The level of constitutional rights an unwed putative father has is
conditioned upon what the putative father has done to grasp his position as father and to
secure and develop those rights. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that
a state can, consistent with due process, require an unwed father to take specific
affirmative steps to establish his rights to a child. Osborne raises the personal
jurisdiction argument only because his efforts to secure and establish his parental rights
fall short of what Utah law requires, and he hopes to avoid a ruling to that effect. He
cannot avoid it, however. He did not establish any rights related to the child, and a Utah
court can finalize the adoption.
18

A.

Lehr v. Robertson Establishes the Analytical Framework for
Determining the Nature of Osborne's Rights.

The benchmark case defining the rights of an unwed putative father is Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983). The issue in Lehr was under what
circumstances due process entitled an unwed father to notice and a hearing before his
child could be adopted. Lehr applies in this case because the requirement of personal
jurisdiction also springs from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Insurance Corp. ofIreland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2104 (1982) ('The requirement that a court have personal
jurisdiction flows not from Art. Ill, but from the Due Process Clause.").
Importantly, the personal jurisdiction requirement "represents a restriction
on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty." Id. (Emphasis added.) For this reason, "the test for personal jurisdiction
requires that 'the maintenance of the suit... not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."'" Id. at 702-03, 102 S. Ct. at 2104 (quoting International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154,158 (1945) (which quoted Milliken
v. Meyer ,311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 342 (1940))). And, "[b]ecause the
requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like
other such rights,, be waived," Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 703, 102 S. Ct. at 2105
(emphasis added).
The birth father in Lehr had not taken the affirmative steps required under
New York law to entitle him to notice of an adoption proceeding, such as filing a notice
19

with the state's birth father registry. The court noted the differences between an unwed
father and a father who has otherwise demonstrated a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood and said "the mere existence of a biological link does not
merit equivalent constitutional protection." 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S. Ct. at 2993. Because
the birth father had not followed New York's statute for establishing his rights, the court
in Lehr was "not assessing the constitutional adequacy of New York's procedures for
terminating a developed relationship," like Osborne assumes he has in this case, but
rather "whether New York has adequately protected [the birth father's] opportunity to
form such a relationship." Id. at 262-63, 103 S. Ct. at 2994 (emphasis added). In other
words, the putative father in Lehr had not established rights to the child, and the only
question was whether he had an adequate chance to do so.
The court further stated:
The significance of the biological connection is that it
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the
blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely
valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails
to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically
compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child's
best interest lie.
Id. at 262, 103 S. Ct. at 2993-94 (emphasis added). Thus, consistent with due process, a
state can require an unwed father to take specific affirmative steps to establish his rights
to a child, and if he does not establish such rights, the state does not have to even listen
to the unwed father.
20

The court examined the New York statute and found that it met due process
requirements for allowing a putative father the chance to establish parental rights. It
concluded:
The legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of
young children and having the adoption proceeding
completed expeditiously that underlie the entire statutory
scheme also justify a trial judge's determination to require all
interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural
requirements of the statute. The Constitution does not
require either a trial judge or a litigant to give special notice
to nonparties who are presumptively capable of asserting
and protecting their own rights.
Id. at 265, 103 S. Ct at 2995 (emphasis added).
It is quite telling that the unwed father in Lehr was termed a "nonparty"
because he had not complied with the affirmative statutory requirements for establishing
rights to the child. Lehr teaches that so long as a state provides a mechanism, consistent
with due process, for a putative father to establish his rights to a child, if the father does
not "adhere precisely to the procedural requirements o f that mechanism, no additional
due process safeguards, such as notice of and participation in an adoption proceeding are
required. Nonparties do not need due process safeguards.
Personal jurisdiction, like notice, is a due process safeguard. See Insurance
Corp., 456 U.S. at 702-03, 102 S. Ct. at 2104-05 (personal jurisdiction is an individual
liberty interest derived from the due process clause). Thus, if a putative father has not
properly established rights to a child and, therefore, is not entitled to further due process
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protections because he is a nonparty, it would not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice to finalize an adoption of the child without his participation.
Few cases have considered the question directly, but ironically one court
that has addressed the issue is the North Carolina Court of Appeals, from Osborne's
home state. In In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 435 S.E.2d 352 (1993), that
court, relying upon the principles stated in Lehr, concluded that "'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice' are not offended by permitting the petitioner to proceed
with terminating the father's parental rights [or finalizing the adoption] in the absence of
his minimum contacts with this State

" 112 N.C. App. at 252, 435 S.E.2d at 354.

The father in Dixon, a resident of Virginia, had not followed procedures required by
North Carolina law to establish his rights. Because he had not, the court said it was
appropriate to terminate his rights. See also In re Williams, 563 S.E.2d 202 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002) (minimum contacts of Pennsylvania unwed father not required to terminate
his rights in North Carolina).11
n

The distinction the U.S. Supreme Court made in Lehr—between terminating a
developed parental relationship and finalizing an adoption where the unwed father has
not established his rights—is important in this case. All of the cases and commentary
Osborne cites that support his position on personal jurisdiction are cases where there is a
"developed" parental relationship. Both Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978),
and May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), were cases between divorced parents.
Lassiterv. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981), involved
the termination of a mother's rights to her child, something very different from the rights
of an unwed putative father. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16, 103 S. Ct. at 2992 n.16.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), involved the termination of
the rights of married parents to their three children. The whole point of Lehr was that
the rights of married parents and unwed putative fathers are very different. See 463 U.S.
at 256-57, 260 n.16, 103 S. Ct. at 2991, 2992 n.16. The Wasserman article Osborne
refers to so heavily does not even talk about personal jurisdiction in the adoption context.
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The question under Lehr then becomes whether Osborne did those things
that were required to establish rights. Whether he did turns on Utah law, not North
Carolina law.
B.

Utah Law Governs the Issue of Whether Osborne Established
His Right to Constitutional Protections.

Whether Osborne established the kind of relationship that acquires
Fourteenth Amendment protections is determined by Utah law because that is where the
adoption is pending. "A court applies its own local law in determining whether to grant
an adoption." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 289 (1971). This rule is
universally applied by state courts when determining an out-of-state birth parent's rights
in an adoption proceeding.
See, e.g., In re Adoption ofC.L. W.9 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (Florida law determined revocation rights of Pennsylvania birth mother who
signed consent in Pennsylvania); B.G. v. H.S., 509 N.E.2d 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(Florida birth father required to follow Indiana procedures to protect his rights); In re
Adoption ofBaby Boy S, 32 Kan. App. 2d 119, 912 P.2d 761 (1996) (Kansas law applied
to determine rights of Ohio birth father where adoption was finalized in Kansas); In re
Petition to Adopt C.M.A., 557 N.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (despite

Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. 111. L. Rev.
813. Osborne also argues that one Utah case is similar to this case, State in the Interest
ofW.A., 2002 UT App. 72, cert granted sub norn., In re W.A., 48 P.3d 979 (Utah 2002)
(Table), which is currently under advisement with this Court for decision. W.A.,
however, is also different because it is a termination of parental rights case involving a
father who had established parental rights.
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paternity proceeding in New Hampshire, notice and consent rights of New Hampshire
birth father determined by Minnesota law); In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248,
435 S.E.2d 352 (1993) (discussed above); In re Adoption ofILK,

111 P.2d 915 (Okla.

1987) (Oklahoma law applied to non-resident birth mother); Stubbs v. Weathersby, 126
Or. App. 596, 869 P.2d 893, 898-99 (1994) (Oregon law determined revocation rights of
Washington birth mother who signed consent in Washington); Burns v. Crenshaw, 84
Or. App. 257, 733 P.2d 922 (1987) (Oregon law determined notice requirements for
Washington birth father); In re Adoption ofMM, 652 P.2d 974, 980-81 (Wyo. 1982)
(Wyoming law determined New York birth mother's revocation rights, even though
consent was taken in New York).
Some of these cases merit discussion because they show clearly that the
rights of the birth parents are determined by the law of the state where the adoption is
pending, not the birth parent's home state. In Burns v. Crenshaw, 84 Or. App. 257, 733
P.2d 922 (1987), the natural mother and father were from Washington. The birth father
filed a filiation proceeding in Washington nearly two months before the baby was born.
He thought the mother might leave to go to Oregon, so he obtained an ex parte temporary
restraining order barring her from leaving Yakima County or placing the baby for
adoption. The birth mother, however, moved to Oregon, delivered her baby, and placed
it for adoption. The birth father did nothing to comply with Oregon law to protect his
rights, such as filing notice of the initiation of the Washington filiation proceeding in
Oregon. Because Oregon law was not complied with, and even though the birth father
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was from Washington, the court held that the putative father was not entitled to notice of
the adoption proceedings. Id. at 261-62, 733 P.2d at 923-24.
In In re Adoption ofMM, 652 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982), the birth mother
executed her consent to adoption in New York, where the child had been born. Before
the adoptive parents got back to Wyoming to file a petition for adoption, the birth mother
declared the revocation of her consent. New York law allowed revocation, but Wyoming
law did not, absent fraud or duress. The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that Wyoming
law applied and affirmed a final adoption decree. 652 P.2d at 979-81.
In Stubbs v. Weathersby, 126 Or. App. 596, 869 P.2d 893, 898-99 (1994),
the birth mother signed a consent in Washington for a couple from Oregon to adopt her
child, which had been bom in Washington. The adoption proceedings were filed in
Oregon. The consent the birth mother signed apparently was not valid in Washington
because it did not meet certain formalities required by Washington law. The consent,
however, met all formalities required by Oregon law. Even though the consent had been
signed in Washington and for a child bom in Washington, the Oregon court held that
Oregon law applied to whether the consent was valid. 869 P.2d at 898-99.
This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have followed this rule in the
past and have applied Utah law to determine the rights of out-of-state birth fathers.12
12

The application of the rule that the law of the forum where the adoption is
pending is applied sometimes means a birth parent has more rights in the state where the
adoption is pending than he or she would have had in his or her home state. See, e.g., In
re Female Infant F, 191 A.D.2d437, 594N.Y.S.2d303 (1993); mdln re Adoption of
Baby Boy £>., 769 A.2d 508 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2001) (in both cases the state where the
adoption was pending provided more rights for the birth parent than his or her home
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See, e.g., In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, 984 P.2d 967 (Utah law applied to
Washington birth father); In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(Utah law applied to Indiana father's rights). Under this rule, Utah law will apply to
determine whether Osborne took the steps required to protect his rights.13
C.

Osborne Did Not Establish His Rights Under Utah Law.

This Court discussed what an out-of-state putative father must do to
establish his rights under Utah law in In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, 984 P.2d
967. Under Utah law, Osborne has not established any rights to the child, thus he is not
entitled to further due process safeguards, including a personal jurisdiction defense,
because he is not a party to the adoption.
1.

Strict Compliance With the Putative Father Provisions Is
Required to Establish Rights.

This Court wrote in B.B.D.:
Under Utah law, "an unmarried biological father has
an inchoate interest that acquires constitutional protection
only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to

state's laws).
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Osborne's argument that North Carolina law should apply to the adoption and
the adoption should be done in North Carolina simply is not supported or even possible.
Osborne cites no authority in support. Osborne argues that the adoptive family should be
required to go to North Carolina to finalize the adoption because Utah courts do not have
jurisdiction over him. This would not work, however, because no North Carolina court
could have jurisdiction over an adoption petition brought by an adoptive family living in
Utah. North Carolina law requires that the adoptive family be domiciled in North
Carolina to file an adoption petition. See N.C. Code Ann. § 48-2-100. Because North
Carolina could not entertain the adoption proceeding even if it wanted to, under the
conflicts of law principle discussed above, North Carolina law also will not apply to the
adoption.
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the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy
and upon the child's birth." An unmarried father
demonstrates his commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood "by providing appropriate medical care and
financial support, and by establishing legal paternity, in
accordance with the requirements of [Utah law]." If an
unmarried father fails to adhere to these requirements,
including taking the necessary steps to establish paternity,
"his biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or
greatly diminished in constitutional significance by his failure
to timely exercise it, or by his failure to strictly comply with
the available legal steps to substantiate it"
1999 UT 70, If 11, 984 P.2d at 970 (bold and underscore emphasis added; citations
omitted; italics and brackets in original).
Among other statutory requirements, the unmarried biological father of a
child younger than six months old at the time of placement14 must (1) "initiate
proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on
Paternity"; (2) "file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the state
registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health"; and (3) "if he had actual
knowledge of the pregnancy, pa[y] a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred
in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b). Importantly, all of these conditions must be performed by the
unmarried birth father "prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or
relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency." Id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)
(emphasis added).

14

The child in this case was placed for adoption before he was five months old.
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An unmarried biological father is "deemed" to have "waived and
surrendered any right in relation to [his] child... including the right to notice of any
judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child" if he does not "fully
and strictly comply" with these and other statutory requirements prior to relinquishment.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5) (emphasis added). If these conditions are not met,
moreover, "his consent to the adoption of the child is not required." Id.
In other words, an unmarried natural father only acquires rights entitling
him to additional due process protection if he first follows the mandates of the statute.
The Lehr court found that requiring a putative father to take affirmative steps, such as
these, is consistent with due process, and that a putative father is "presumptively capable
of asserting and protecting [his] own rights." 463 U.S. at 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2995. If he
does not follow the required steps, he never acquires those rights, and the Lehr court
called the putative father in that case a "nonparty." Id. A nonparty is not entitled to due
process safeguards.
The Washington birth father in B.B.D. did not do the things he was
required to do by the Utah adoption code to protect his rights. As a result, this Court
wrote "that he has lost any parental right or interest to B.B.D." 1999 UT 70,112, 984
P.2d at 970. Certainly, someone who has "lost any parental right or interest" to the child
to be adopted would be a nonparty.
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2.

Osborne Failed to Establish His Rights.

Like the birth father in B.B.D., Osborne did not take any of the steps
required under Utah law to establish any parental right or interest to the child. Osborne
did not file a paternity action in Utah or register notice of that paternity action with the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics. R. 67. Based on this, the Fourth District Court
concluded—in the motion to quash proceeding to which Osborne was a party—that
"Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements for preserving his parental
rights under Utah law," and that "Osborne has failed to take any action according to the
statutory requirements, and so has waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise
had." R. 144. Osborne did not appeal this ruling or otherwise seek to have it vacated,
even in his petition for writ of mandamus.
Later, that same court ruled that Osborne "is deemed to have waived and
surrendered any right in relation to the minor child, including the right to notice of any
judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the
adoption of the child is not required." Add. 4. Osborne has also done nothing to appeal
or set aside this ruling.15

15

Osborne claims he would be entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding in
North Carolina. This is not true, however, because this ruling and the earlier ruling by
the Utah district court effectively terminated his parental rights. Therefore, under N.C.
Code Ann. § 48-3»603(a)(l), his consent would not be required to finalize an adoption in
North Carolina. In any event, the adoption cannot be done in North Carolina because the
adoptive parents live in Utah. Thus, Utah law, not North Carolina law, will apply to the
adoption and determine his rights to notice.
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3.

The Unknowing Nonresident Putative Father Provisions
Do Not Apply to Osborne And, In Any Event, He Did Not
Comply With Them.

The birth father in B.B.D. also argued that the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4), which apply to out-of-state birth fathers who "do[] not know or
have reason to know that the mother is residing in the state of Utah," Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4.15(4)(c), should apply to him because he was from Washington. This Court
disagreed because the birth father knew the mother was in Utah and may place the child
for adoption. 1999 UT 70,ffij31-32, 984 P.2d at 974. These provisions also do not
apply to Osbome because he knew the mother had contacted an adoption agency in Utah
one month before the child's birth, and that she came to Utah to give birth and to place
the child for adoption. Mand. Pet. at 4, 6; R. 36-38,ffif9-11, 23.
Yet, if the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4) applied, Osborne
did not comply with them. To establish his rights under Section 78-30-4.15(4), an
unmarried birth father must comply "with the most stringent and complete
requirements of the state where the mother previously resided or was located, in order to
protect and preserve his parental interest and right in the child in cases of adoption."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4)(d) (emphasis added). Osborne never has had any
"parental interest" in the child under North Carolina law because the mother was married
to someone else when she had the child. R. 69-70.
In North Carolina, as in many other states, when a child is bom to a
married woman, like the birth mother in this case, her husband is presumed by the law to
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be the child's father. Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 13 S.E.2d 224,226 (1941) ("child born
of a married woman was presumed legitimate"); Rosero v. Blake, 563 S.E.2d 248, 252
(N.C. Ct. App.) ("When a child is born to a married woman, her husband is legally
presumed to be the child's father."), writ allowed, 356 N.C. 166, 568 S.E.2d 610 (2002).
This presumption cannot be overcome by a person claiming to be the "real" father unless
that person first files a legitimation proceeding and proves paternity by "clear and
convincing evidence." N.C. Code Ann. § 49-12.1. Until such a finding is made by a
court, a putative father of a child born to a married woman is not entitled to any
recognition as the father of the child. See Rosero, 563 S.E.2d at 252-53.
The birth mother in this case was married when the child was born, and the
child was even given the last name of the husband. R. 69-70, 72. Thus, under North
Carolina law, the husband was the legal father of the child. Osborne did not file a
legitimation proceeding in North Carolina prior to the birth mother's and her husband's
relinquishments to Adoption Center, even though the birth mother had refused to execute
two different voluntary declarations of paternity naming Osborne as the father. R. 69-70,
74-75, 36. As such, the only legal parents the child ever had under North Carolina
law—the birth mother and her husband—both relinquished the child to Adoption Center
before Osborne formally made any attempt to claim paternity.16 Thus, Osborne did not

16

Osborne's paternity proceeding in North Carolina does not comply with N.C.
Code Ann. § 49-12.1 for proving he is the real father of the child. That section requires
that the mother's spouse and the child be made parties to the proceeding and that the
child be appointed a guardian ad litem. Osborne has not satisfied either of these
requirements. See Pet. App. 37.
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do what he could have done under North Carolina law to establish paternity as required
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4).
D.

Osborne Is Not Entitled to Due Process Safeguards Because He
Did Not Establish Rights to the Child,

The Lehr court indicated that by failing to establish his rights, the birth
father in that case was a nonparty to the adoption and was not entitled to the further due
process right of notice of the adoption. See 463 U.S. at 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2995. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5) provides that by failing to follow the provisions of the
adoption code to establish his rights, Osborne "waived and surrendered any right in
relation to [his] child... including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in
connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is
not required." (Emphasis added.) The personal jurisdiction defense Osborne claims is
an individual liberty interest—i.e., a right—founded upon the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Insurance Corp. ofIreland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702,102 S. Ct. 2099, 2104 (1982). Like notice, it is subject to
waiver. Id. at 703, 102 S. Ct. at 2105.
Osborne failed to establish any rights related to the child and, therefore, is
not entitled to further due process safeguards under Lehr or under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4.14(5). He is a "nonparty," 463 U.S. at 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2995, and personal
jurisdiction is, therefore, not an issue. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly that Osborne
did not establish his rights to the child and that personal jurisdiction was not an issue.
That decision should be affirmed.
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E,

The Utah Putative Father Provisions Are Constitutional on
Their Face and as Applied.

While claiming to argue only that he should be allowed to intervene and
assert his personal jurisdiction defense, Pet. Br. at 49, Osborne suggests throughout his
brief that the putative father provisions of the Utah adoption code are unconstitutional,
either on their face or as applied to him. This Court held, however, in In re Adoption of
B.B.D., that these provisions of the Utah adoption code satisfied both due process and
equal protection concerns. 1999 UT 70,fflf13-21, 984 P.2d at 970-72. See also Judge
Wilkins' opinion in In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(provisions of adoption code cutting off rights of unmarried Indiana birth father did not
violate due process). Thus, these provisions are constitutional on their face.
They are also constitutional as applied to Osborne. The putative father
provisions are only unconstitutional as applied "when it is impossible for the father to
file the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his
own" Ellis v. Social Servs. Dept, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980). If it is impossible
for the father to comply, "due process requires that he be permitted to show that he was
not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statute." Id. A reasonable
opportunity to comply is only required after a finding that it was impossible for the birth
father to comply, through no fault of his own, at the time required. Wells v. Children's
Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199, 208 (Utah 1983).
Osborne, by his own admission, was aware of the need to establish his
rights before the birth mother and her husband relinquished their rights, and it was not
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impossible for him to do so. The birth mother initially contacted a Utah agency in
July, 2001, and came to Utah in August, 2001, to deliver the child and place it for
adoption. R. 37-38, fH 9-11. Osborne did nothing then to establish his rights. Later, the
birth mother twice refused to execute voluntary declarations of paternity. R. 36, ^f 18.
Again, he did nothing under North Carolina or Utah law to establish his rights. The birth
mother left Osborne on or about December 10, 2001, and it was not until 25 days later
that she placed the child for adoption with Adoption Center. R. 35-36,fflf20, 25.
During this interim, Osborne again did nothing to establish his rights.
Moreover, under North Carolina law, because the birth mother was
married, her husband was considered the legal father of the child, not Osborne. Rosero
v. Blake, 563 S.E.2d 248, 252 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) ("When a child is born to a married
woman, her husband is legally presumed to be the child's father."). This presumption
cannot be overcome by Osborne except by filing a legitimation proceeding in court and
proving paternity by "clear and convincing evidence." N.C. Code Ann. § 49-12.1.
Osborne is presumed to know the law. Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753,
755 (Utah 1984) (birth father in that case was "presumed to know the law" for purposes
of a constitutionality analysis).
Osborne was on notice that the law did not consider him the father, that the
birth mother was considering adoption and had refused to allow him to voluntarily
declare his paternity, and thus that he needed to establish his rights. It was not
impossible for him to do so. Yet, he waited until more than one month after the child

34

had been placed for adoption to bring a paternity action in North Carolina, and he never
has done anything required in Utah to protect his rights. Thus, the putative father
provisions are constitutional as applied to Osborne. He failed to establish his rights and
he is not entitled to any additional due process safeguards.
III.

NO COURT HAS EVER RECOGNIZED A RIGHT TO SEEK
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF WITHOUT CONSENTING TO
PERSONAL JURISDICTION, AND NO SUCH RIGHT EXISTS.
Osborne asked the Court of Appeals to, among other things, order that he

be entitled to intervene or bring a collateral action to challenge the adoption "on
jurisdictional grounds without waiving any personal jurisdictional defense." Mand. Pet.
at 3. Had Osborne done what he needed to do to establish his rights, he would not be
afraid of invoking the powers of a Utah court and submitting himself to personal
jurisdiction. In fact, he likely would be pounding on the courthouse door, anxious to
assert his developed parental rights. It is only because he did not establish his rights that
he had to create this issue.
It is settled law that a person submits himself to the jurisdiction of a Utah
court by voluntarily demanding justice in that court. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59,
67-68 (1938). Such jurisdiction is the "price which the state may exact as the condition
for opening its courts to the plaintiff." Id. This makes sense because personal
jurisdiction is rooted in individual liberty interests and, as such, is something that may be
waived. Insurance Corp. ofIreland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 703, 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2105 (1982). Utah is not required by the federal
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constitution to permit Osborne, or any other person, to seek relief from one of its courts
without consenting to personal jurisdiction. No state is required to provide such a
remedy. Id. at 704, 102 S. Ct. at 2105 ("[T]he Court has upheld state procedures which
find constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state court in the voluntary
use of certain state procedures.").
Requiring a putative father to come forward and assert his own rights is
also consistent with Lehr, where the court said a state could require an unwed putative
father to take specific affirmative steps to establish his rights regarding a child. 463 U.S.
at 262, 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2993-95. Osborne thinks he can stand on the sidelines and play
the game without going on the field. Under Lehr, he cannot. Lehr requires that he
"adhere precisely to the procedural requirements o f Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b)
or he is not a party to the adoption. Id. at 265, 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
Likewise, neither of the state constitutional provisions Osborne quotes
requires that he be allowed to challenge an adoption in Utah without the courts of Utah
exercising jurisdiction over him. He cites the Utah due process and open courts
provisions, Utah Constitution, article I, §§ 7 and 11, saying he has a right of access to the
courts and to have his day in court. Pet. Br. at 47-48. Osborne's Utah due process
argument fails for the same reason the federal courts hold that asserting one's rights in
court waives personal jurisdiction, and because Lehr held that a putative father could be
required to take affirmative steps to establish his rights.
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Osborne's open courts argument fails because he has a right of access to
Utah courts to challenge the adoption. Osborne asks this Court to create a new right for
him to challenge the adoption without his consenting to personal jurisdiction. Yet, no
such right has ever been recognized by a state or federal court. The open courts
provision does not require this Court to create new remedies. Burton v. Exam Center
Ind. & Gen. Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, H 18, 994 P.2d 1261, 1267 ("[N]early
eighty-five years ago this court held that where no right of action is given or no remedy
exists under either the common law or statute, this section creates none.").
Osborne also cites for the first time Article 1, § 24 of the Utah Constitution,
the uniform operation of laws provision, but he did not raise section 24 in the Court of
Appeals. In any event, the uniform operation of laws provision does not require that
Osborne be allowed to seek affirmative relief in a court without consenting to personal
jurisdiction. Everyone who seeks affirmative relief in a court consents to personal
jurisdiction. Adam, 303 U.S. at 67-68. This rule operates uniformly as to all persons.
IV.

THE UTAH COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO FINALIZE THE
ADOPTION.
A.

Utah Courts Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-7(1) provides that "[ajdoption proceedings shall
be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district court... in the district
where the person adopting resides." No other court has jurisdiction over the adoption
because the adoptive family in this case resides in Utah. The adoption cannot be
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finalized in North Carolina because North Carolina law requires that the adoptive parents
live in North Carolina. N.C. Code Ann. § 48-2-100.
These laws are consistent with the general rule stated in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 78 (1971):
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to grant an
adoption if
(a) it is the state of domicil of either the adopted child or the
adoptive parent, and
(b) the adoptive parent and either the adoptive child or the
person having legal custody of the child are subject to its
personal jurisdiction.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 78 (1971).
Comment a to section 78 recognizes that the interests of a natural parent are
affected by an adoption, but also states that if jurisdiction to grant an adoption were
confined only to cases where the state has personal jurisdiction over all persons whose
interests will be affected, including natural parents, "[t]his would be undesirable." Id.
Comment a. Some adoptions, like this one, would also be impossible because no state
has jurisdiction over all affected persons. Yet, because the paramount issue in an
adoption is the best interests of the child, "[cjourts sitting in either the state of domicil of
the child or in that of the adoptive parents will normally be equally well situated to
determine such issues." Id.
The adoptive parents in this case are from Utah as is Adoption Center,
which has legal custody of the child. The child was born in Utah and has lived here now
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for almost 11 months. The child is also a Utah domicil because the natural mother and
her husband, the only legal father he has had, relinquished the child to Adoption Center
and the child has been placed with a Utah family. See In re Adoption ofHalloway, 732
P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986) (when a child is relinquished for adoption "the child acquires
the domicile of the party who stands in loco parentis to him or her and with whom he or
she lives at the time of abandonment"). Thus, the Utah court has jurisdiction to grant an
adoption.
B.

If Personal Jurisdiction Is Required Over a Putative Father
Who Has Failed to Establish Rights, the Status Exception to
Minimum Contacts Protects the Interests of Children Placed for
Adoption.

If personal jurisdiction over Osborne is required even though he failed to
establish his rights, the status exception to minimum contacts allows a Utah court to
exercise such jurisdiction. Utah has subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption, but
Osborne claims that Utah cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Yet, North
Carolina would not have subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption because the
adoptive parents do not live there, and it would not have personal jurisdiction over the
adoptive family. If the adoption cannot be finalized because of these circumstances, the
child is the one who suffers.
The Court has been fully briefed on the status exception in State in the
Interest ofW.A.9 2002 UT App. 72, cert, granted sub norn., In re W.A., 48 P.3d 979
(Utah 2002) (Table). This Court heard oral arguments in the W.A. case on
September 6, 2002, and the case is currently under advisement. As indicated earlier,
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Adoption Center views W.A. as a different kind of case because it involved termination
of the parental rights of a father who had established parental rights in his child, unlike
Osborne. Because the Court has been fully advised on the issue, Adoption Center will
only briefly review it.
In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme Court noted an
exception to the usual minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction: "We do not
suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the
particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the standard
of fairness." A/, at 208 n.30.
The Shaffer court further stated:
Pennoyer [v. Neff] itself recognized that its rigid
categories . . . could not accommodate some necessary
litigation. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Field's opinion carefully
noted that cases involving the personal status of the plaintiff,
such as divorce actions, could be adjudicated in the plaintiffs
home State even though the defendant could not be served
within that State.
433 U.S. at 201.
The status exception to minimum contacts has long been recognized in the
divorce context. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942); Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 209 (1888) (upholding a legislative divorce entered by a territory in
which only one spouse resided). Thus, due process is not violated by entry of a divorce
decree binding on a nonresident spouse as long as one spouse is domiciled in the issuing
state. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544 (1948).
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The status exception has also been recognized by several states in parental
rights termination proceedings. In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 543 P.2d 454,459
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); In re Marriage ofHudson, 434 N.E. 2d 107 (Ind. App. 1982),
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983); In reM.L.K., 768 P.2d 316, 319 (Kan. App. 1984);
Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Mont. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1071
(1980); In re Adoption ofCopeland, 43 S.W.3d 483,486-87 (Term. Ct. App. 2000),
appeal denied April 16, 2001; White v. Blake, 859 S.W.2d 551, 563 (Tex. App. 1993);
Hudson v. Hudson, 670 P.2d 287 (Wash. App. 1983); A.E.H v. C.C., 468 N.W.2d 190,
198-99 (Wis.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 925 (1991). These courts accept the view
summarized by the Kansas court: "Termination of parental rights is nothing more than a
determination of the legal status between the natural parent and the child." M.L.K., 768
P.2d at 319. Contra Phillips v. Thornfelt, 1986 Ky. App. Lexis 1116 (Kentucky Ct. App.
1986) (unpublished).17
17

The overwhelming majority of state courts addressing the issue has also held that
due process permits adjudication of the custody of a child residing in the forum state
even absent the nonresident parent's minimum contacts with the state. In re Marriage of
Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443, 450-60 (Cal. App. 1981); People ex rel. State of
Wyoming ex rel. Watson v. Stout, 969 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); Balestrieri
v. Maliska, 622 So. 2d 561, 563 & n.l (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Thompson v.
Thompson, 526 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); In re Marriage ofMobley, 569 N.E.2d
323 (111. App. Ct. 1991); Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001); Martinez v.
Reed, 490 So. 2d 303, 306 n.l (La. Ct. App. 1986); Glanzner v. State Dep 't of Social
Servs., 835 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Genoe v. Genoe, 500 A.2d 3 (N.J. App.
1985); Harris v. Harris, 410 S.E.2d 527 (N.C Ct. App. 1991); Miff v. Miff, 829 P.2d
34, 36 n.5 (Okl. 1992); Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405,409 (R.I. 1981); Roderick v.
Roderick, 116 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Term. Ct. App. 1989); In re S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d 80,
84 (Tex. 1992); McAtee v. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d 611 (W. Va. 1984); Davidson v.
Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 556 (Wise. Ct. App. 1992). Contra In re John Doe, 926
P.2d 1290, 1299 (Haw. 1996); In re Vernon R.V., 991 P.2d 986 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the status exception also should
apply to adoptions. In In re Adoption ofILK,

131 P.2d 915 (Okla. 1987), the

stepmother and father sought an adoption of the child without consent of the nonresident
mother. A key issue was the court's personal jurisdiction over the mother because she
lacked minimum contacts with the state. The court held that minimum contacts of the
mother was not required because no personal judgment was sought against the mother.
All that was sought was a status determination relating to the child, and it was a resident
of Oklahoma. See also In re Baby Boy Dixon, 112 N.C. App. 248, 435 S.E.2d 352
(1993) (minimum contacts not required to terminate parental rights collateral to
adoption).
The status exception provides personal jurisdiction over a putative father in
an adoption absent minimum contacts. Otherwise, a court could have jurisdiction over
the adoption itself, and the adoptive family and child may even be residents of the state
where the adoption is pending, yet a natural parent may be a resident of another state and
may not have minimum contacts with the state where the adoption is pending. Children
in such cases, like this one, are the ones who suffer. The status exception allows
adoptions in cases like this one to be finalized so that the child will be able to have as
normal a life as possible as soon as possible.

See also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); In re Dean, 447 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1984);
Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 406 N.E.2d 1121 (Ohio 1980) (these courts refused to give
full faith and credit to custody orders from other states absent the other state's personal
jurisdiction over nonresident parent).
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V.

IF THIS COURT SIDES WITH OSBORNE, INTERSTATE
ADOPTIONS WILL CEASE AND THOUSANDS OF FINALIZED
ADOPTIONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE.
If the Court agrees with Osborne on his personal jurisdiction argument,

interstate adoptions in Utah will cease and literally thousands of adoptions already
finalized in Utah would be subject to challenge. A judgment entered without personal
jurisdiction over the party to be bound is null and void. Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d
791, 795 (Utah 1988) (judgment "entered without valid in personam jurisdiction . . . is
null and void"). Agreeing with Osborne would mean that adoptive families would never
want to take a child into their home if any putative father of the child is a nonresident of
Utah. Interstate adoptions would be brought to a standstill. Also, any already final
adoption would be subject to challenge if the putative birth father is a nonresident and
does not have minimum contacts with Utah. There likely are thousands of such
adoptions on the books in Utah.
Not only would this be a disaster-in-the-making, such a ruling would be
contrary to clearly stated legislative policy, and the "strong state interest" recognized by
this Court "in immediate and secure adoptions for eligible newborns." Wells v.
Children s Aid Society, 681 P.2dl99, 203 (Utah 1984). The Legislature has stated that
"the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for
adoptive children in a prompt manner, [and] in preventing the disruption of adoptive
placements." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(a) (emphasis added). "[A]n unmarried
mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about the future of a
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newborn child,... has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her
future and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding the permanence
of an adoptive placement." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(b). Ruling for Osborne
would undermine these policies.
The Legislature also concluded that "adoptive children have a right to
permanence and stability in adoptive placements," and that "the interests of the state,
the mother, the child, and the adoptive parents described in this section outweigh
the interest of an unmarried biological father who does not timely grasp the
opportunity to establish and demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance with
the requirements of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-4.12(2)(c) and
78-30-4.12(3)(c) (emphasis added). See also Wells, 681 P.2d at 203. ("The state has a
strong interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume the parental role
over [illegitimate] children, not just to assure immediate and continued physical care but
also to facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to its parents.")
Yet, if the Court places greater weight on Osborne's personal jurisdiction
argument—asserted by a person who is not the legal father of the child under North
Carolina law and who did not establish his rights under Utah law—than it places on the
right of the mother to place the child for adoption, on the state's compelling interest in
stable and permanent placements, or on the right of the child to be in a secure and stable
placement, these compelling interests will disappear for interstate adoptions. The Court
should not bring a halt to interstate adoptions or jeopardize thousands of already
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finalized adoptions by allowing nonresident putative fathers to challenge these adoptions
on minimum contacts grounds.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Writ of Certiorari
as improvidently granted, should remand with instructions to dismiss the Mandamus
Petition, or should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision.
DATED this 22nd day of November, 2002.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

2t

Larry S.vfenki:
Attorneys for Respondent
Adoption Center of Choice
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of November, 2002, two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ADOPTION CENTER
OF CHOICE were mailed in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, to:
Phillip E. Lowry
Howard, Lewis & Peterson
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
Attorneys for Petitioner

S: WPDATA Pleading\ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE.OSBORNE.RESPONDENTS BRIEF.FINAL.wpd
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ADDENDUM

Tabl

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12. Rights and responsibilities of parties in adoption
proceedings.
(1) The Legislature finds that the rights and interests of all parties affected by an adoption
proceeding must be considered and balanced in determining what constitutional protections and
processes are necessary and appropriate.
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for
adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive
placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of children;
(b) an unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about
the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make timely and
appropriate decisions regarding her future and the future of the child, and is entitled to
assurance regarding the permanence of an adoptive placement;
(c) adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive placements;
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest in
retaining custody of an adopted child; and
(e) an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires constitutional
protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth. The state
has a compelling interest in requiring unmarried biological fathers to demonstrate that
commitment by providing appropriate medical care and financial support and by
establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.
(3)
(a) In enacting Sections 78-30-4.11 through 78-30-4.21, the Legislature prescribes the
conditions for determining whether an unmarried biological father's action is sufficiently
prompt and substantial to require constitutional protection.
(b) If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the opportunities to establish a
relationship with his child that are available to him, his biological parental interest may
be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in constitutional significance by his failure to
timely exercise it, or by his failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps to
substantiate it.
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the state's compelling
interest. The Legislature finds that the interests of the state, the mother, the child, and the
adoptive parents described in this section outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological
father who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and demonstrate a
relationship with his child in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.
(d) An unmarried biological father has the primary responsibility to protect his rights.
(e) An unmarried biological father is presumed to know that the child may be adopted
without his consent unless he strictly complies with the provisions of this chapter,
manifests a prompt and full commitment to his parental responsibilities, and establishes
paternity.
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a right of privacy with regard to her
pregnancy and adoption plan, and therefore has no legal obligation to disclose the identity of an
unmarried biological father prior to or during an adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to
volunteer information to the court with respect to the father.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13, Notice of adoption proceedings.
(1) An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a sexual
relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption
proceeding regarding that child may occur, and has a duty to protect his own rights and interests.
He is therefore entitled to actual notice of a birth or an adoption proceeding with regard to that
child only as provided in this section.
(2) Notice of an adoption proceeding shall be served on each of the following persons:
(a) any person or agency whose consent or relinquishment is required under Section 7830-4.14 unless that right has been terminated by waiver, relinquishment, consent, or
judicial action;
(b) any person who has initiated a paternity proceeding and filed notice of that action
with the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, in accordance
with Subsection (3);
(c) any legally appointed custodian or guardian of the adoptee;
(d) the petitioner's spouse, if any, only if he has not joined in the petition;
(e) the adoptee's spouse, if any;
(f) any person who is recorded on the birth certificate as the child's father, with the
knowledge and consent of the mother;
(g) any person who is openly living in the same household with the child at the time the
consent is executed or relinquishment made, and who is holding himself out to be the
child's father; and
(h) any person who is married to the child's mother at the time she executes her consent to
the adoption or relinquishes the child for adoption.
(3)
(a) In order to preserve any right to notice and consent, an unmarried biological father
may initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act
on Paternity, and file a notice of the initiation of those proceedings with the state registrar
of vital statistics within the Department of Health prior to the mother's execution of
consent or her relinquishment to an agency. That action and notice may also be filed prior
to the child's birth.
(b) If the unmarried biological father does not know the county in which the birth mother
resides, he may initiate his action in any county, subject to a change in trial pursuant to
Section 78-13-7.
(c) The Department of Health shall provide forms for the purpose of filing the notice
described in Subsection (3)(a), and make those forms available in the office of the county
health department in each county.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14. Necessary consent to adoption or relinquishment for
adoption.
(1) Either relinquishment for adoption to a licensed child-placing agency or consent to adoption
is required from:
(a) the adoptee, if he is more than 12 years of age, unless he does not have the mental
capacity to consent;
(b) both parents or the surviving parent of an adoptee who was conceived or born within a
marriage, unless the adoptee is 18 years of age or older;
(c) the mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage;
(d) any biological parent who has been adjudicated to be the child's biological father by a
court of competent jurisdiction prior to the mother's execution of consent or her
relinquishment to an agency for adoption;
(e) any biological parent who has executed and filed a voluntary declaration of paternity
with the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health in accordance
with Title 78, Chapter 45e, prior to the mother's execution of consent or her
relinquishment to an agency for adoption, which voluntary declaration of paternity is
considered filed when entered into a database that can be accessed by the Department of Health;
(f) an unmarried biological father of an adoptee, as defined in Section 78-30-4.11, only if
the requirements and conditions of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) have been proven; and
(g) the licensed child-placing agency to whom an adoptee has been relinquished and that
is placing the child for adoption.
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an unmarried biological father is necessary
only if the father has strictly complied with the requirements of this section.
* **

(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of age at the time he is placed with
adoptive parents, an unmarried biological father shall have manifested a full commitment
to his parental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this subsection
prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to
a licensed child-placing agency. The father shall:
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform
Act on Paternity, and file with that court a sworn affidavit stating that he is fully
able and willing to have full custody of the child, setting forth his plans for care of
the child, and agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of
expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth;
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the state
registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, in a confidential
registry established by the department for that purpose, which notice is considered
filed when the notice is entered in the registry of notices from unmarried
biological fathers; and
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paid a fair and reasonable
amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and
the child's birth, in accordance with his means, and when not prevented from
doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child.
(3) An unmarried biological father whose consent is required under Subsection (1) or (2) may
nevertheless lose his right to consent if the court determines, in accordance with the requirements

and procedures of Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 4, Termination of Parental Rights Act, that his rights
should be terminated, based on the petition of any interested party.
(4) If there is no showing that an unmarried biological father has consented to or waived his
rights regarding a proposed adoption, the petitioner shall file with the court a certificate from the
state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, stating that a diligent search has
been made of the registry of notices from unmarried biological fathers described in Subsection
(2)(b)(ii), and that no filing has been found pertaining to the father of the child in question, or if a
filing is found, stating the name of the putative father and the time and date of filing. That
certificate shall be filed with the court prior to entrance of a final decree of adoption.
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly comply with each of the
conditions provided in this section, is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in
relation to the child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with
the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4,15. Responsibility of each party for their own actions -- Fraud or
misrepresentation - Statutory compliance.
(1) Each parent of a child conceived or born outside of marriage is responsible for his or her own
actions and is not excused from strict compliance with the provisions of this chapter based upon
any action, statement, or omission of the other parent or third parties.
(2) Any person injured by fraudulent representations or actions in connection with an adoption is
entitled to pursue civil or criminal penalties in accordance with existing law. A fraudulent
representation is not a defense to strict compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and is
not a basis for dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption decree, or an
automatic grant of custody to the offended party. Custody determinations shall be based on the
best interest of the child, in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-30-4.16.
(3) The Legislature finds no practical way to remove all risk of fraud or misrepresentation in
adoption proceedings, and has provided a method for absolute protection of an unmarried
biological father's rights by compliance with the provisions of this chapter. In balancing the
rights and interests of the state, and of all parties affected by fraud, specifically the child, the
adoptive parents, and the unmarried biological father, the Legislature has determined that the
unmarried biological father is in the best position to prevent or ameliorate the effects of fraud and
that, therefore, the burden of fraud shall be borne by him.
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried biological father who resides in another state may
not, in every circumstance, be reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly comply with, the
requirements of this chapter. Therefore when all of the following requirements have been met,
that unmarried biological father may contest an adoption, prior to finalization of the decree of
adoption, and assert his interest in the child; the court may then, in its discretion, proceed with an
evidentiary hearing under Subsection 78-30-4.16(2):
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has resided in another state where the
unmarried mother was also located or resided;
(b) the mother left that state without notifying or informing the unmarried biological
father that she could be located in the state of Utah;
(c) the unmarried biological father has, through every reasonable means, attempted to
locate the mother but does not know or have reason to know that the mother is residing in
the state of Utah; and
(d) the unmarried biological father has complied with the most stringent and complete
requirements of the state where the mother previously resided or was located, in order to
protect and preserve his parental interest and right in the child in cases of adoption.

North Carolina Adoption Provisions
North Carolina Code §§ 48-2-100, Jurisdiction.
(a)Adoption shall be by a special proceeding before the clerk of superior court.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
commenced under this Chapter exists if, at the commencement of the proceeding:
(1) The adoptee has lived in this State for at least the six consecutive months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition or from birth, and the prospective adoptive parent is
domiciled in this State; or
(2) The prospective adoptive parent has lived in or been domiciled in this State for at least
the six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition.
(c) The courts of this State shall not exercise jurisdiction under this Chapter if at the time the
petition for adoption is filed, a court of any other state is exercising jurisdiction substantially in
conformity with the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Article 2 of
Chapter 50A of the General Statutes.

North Carolina Code §§ 48-3-603. Persons whose consent is not required.
(a)Consent to an adoption of a minor is not required of a person or entity whose consent is not
required under G.S. 48-3-601, or:
(1) An individual whose parental rights and duties have been terminated under Article 11
of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes or by a court of competent jurisdiction in another
state;...

North Carolina Legitimation Provisions
North Carolina Code §§ 49-12.1. Legitimation when mother married.
(a)The putative father of a child born to a mother who is married to another man may file a
special proceeding to legitimate the child. The procedures shall be the same as those specified by
G.S. 49-10, except that the spouse of the mother of the child shall be a necessary party to the
proceeding and shall be properly served. A guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent the
child if the child is a minor.
(b) The presumption of legitimacy can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
(c) The parties may enter a consent order with the approval of the clerk of superior court. The
order entered by the clerk shall find the facts and declare the proper person the father of the child
and may change the surname of the child.
(d) The effect of legitimation under this section shall be the same as provided by G.S. 49-11.
(e) A certified copy of the order of legitimation under this section shall be sent by the clerk of
superior court under his official seal to the State Registrar of Vital Statistics who shall make a
new birth certificate bearing the full name of the father of the child and, if ordered by the clerk,
changing the surname of the child.

North Carolina Code §§ 49-10. Legitimation.
The putative father of any child born out of wedlock, whether such father resides in North
Carolina or not, may apply by a verified written petition, filed in a special proceeding in the
superior court of the county in which the putative father resides or in the superior court of the
county in which the child resides, praying that such child be declared legitimate. The mother, if
living, and the child shall be necessary parties to the proceeding, and the full names of the father,
mother and the child shall be set out in the petition. A certified copy of a certificate of birth of
the child shall be attached to the petition. If it appears to the court that the petitioner is the father
of the child, the court may thereupon declare and pronounce the child legitimated; and the full
names of the father, mother and the child shall be set out in the court order decreeing legitimation
of the child. The clerk of the court shall record the order in the record of orders and decrees and it
shall be cross- indexed under the name of the father as plaintiff or petitioner on the plaintiffs side
of the cross-index, and under the name of the mother, and the child as defendants or respondents
on the defendants' side of the cross-index.
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Frank Osborne,
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ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a petition for writ of
certiorari, filed on August 1, 2002, pursuant to Rule 48, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The court granted a motion to temporarily stay the district
court's order finalizing adoption, on July 3, 2002, pending an en
banc hearing before the full court on September 4, 2002.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the petition for writ of certiorari is
granted. The stay of the district court's order finalizing the
adoption will remain until the court issues its decision in the
case. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as soon as the record is filed with
the Supreme Court an expedited briefing schedule will be
established and notices will be mailed. The case will be set for
oral argument immediately following the expedited briefing
schedule.

Dated the / /

day of September, 2002

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on September 11, 2002, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
PHILLIP E. LOWRY
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Dated this September 11, 2002.
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PHILLIP E LOWRY (6603), for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P O Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone (801)373-6345
Facsimile (801)377-4991

j \pel\osborae notice dis
Our File No 26,372

Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, HI,
Case No 020400623
Judge Hansen

A Minor Child

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)l, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner herein files this Notice
of Dismissal of his petition.
DATED this 27th day of March, 2002.

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this

day of March, 2002.

Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Wood & Crapo
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84603
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, HI,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 0204026^-

A Minor Child.
Date: March 18,2002
Judge Steven L. Hansen

Before the Court is a Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.
("Adoption Center"). The Court, having heard oral argument, and reviewed and considered all
relevant memoranda, including the supplemental memoranda filed while this Motion was under
advisement, now grants Adoption Center's Motion.
FACTS
1.

Adoption Center is an adoption agency licensed by the State of Utah.

2.

On or about January 4, 2002, Angela Baker relinquished her son, Kenneth Skyler Baker,

to Adoption Center to be placed for adoption in Utah.
3.

Kenneth was bom in Utah on August 6, 2001. His birth certificate lists no father, only

Angela as the birth mother.
4.

On January 15, 2002, Angela Baker's husband, Donny Baker, who is not the birth father

but is the legal father, gave written consent to Kenneth's placement for adoption.
5.

Frank Osborne, a resident of the State of North Carolina and petitioner in this action,

claims to be Kenneth's birth father. Osborne commenced a paternity and custody action in North
Carolina on February 11, 2002.
6.

Kenneth was placed with a family for adoption sometime previous to February 11, 2002.

7.

On February 14, 2002, Osborne filed a verified petition challenging subject matter

jurisdiction of the Court in this matter, along with an ex parte motion to open the adoption file,
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and a motion for order to show cause.
8.

This Court granted the ex parte motion in part on February 15, 2002. The Court ordered

the adoption file opened, but only if the file could be identified through a search of Court records.
Osborne has apparently been unable to identify the adoption file.
9.

The Court declined to grant Osborne an order requiring Adoption Center to disclose the

identities of the adoptive parents and denied Osborne's motion to reconsider the ex parte order of
February 15.
10.

On February 21, 2002, Osborne served Adoption Center with a subpoena seeking

disclosure of the identities of the adoptive parents, the attorneys involved in the filing of the
adoption petition, the county in which the petition was filed, the names of any judges who have
issued rulings or orders in the case, and the case number of the file.
11.

On February 26, 2002, Adoption Center responded with this Motion to Quash Subpoena.
ANALYSIS AND RULING
Adoption Center argues that it should be protected from subpoena for the following

reasons. First, the identities of the adoptive parents of Kenneth are protected and confidential
under the regulations governing state licensed child-placement agencies. Second, assuming Frank
Osborne is Kenneth's biological father, he has completely waived any right that he might have
with respect to Kenneth under the Utah code. Third, Adoption Center asserts that because the
adoption of Kenneth is not final, Adoption Center still has legal custody and control of Kenneth,
and Osborne does not need the identities of the adoptive parents to protect his interests.
The Court concludes that Adoption Center's analysis of the applicable law is accurate.
Child placing agencies are required to treat all adoption records as confidential, and "[n]o
information [should] be shared with any person without the appropriate consent forms." Utah
Admin, Code § R501-7-4(A)(15) (2002). Because these records are confidential and protected by
law, the Court must quash or modify any subpoena requiring disclosure when no exception or
waiver applies. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2001). The court concludes that Osborne has
not articulated any waiver or exception that should apply in this case.

1.4F.

Further, Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements for preserving his
parental rights under Utah law. The legislature has established the standard that must be met by
an unmarried biological father to preserve his rights, stating very clearly that "[he] is presumed to
know that the child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the
provisions of [Utah Code Title 78, Chapter 30], manifests a prompt and full commitment to his
parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(e) (2001).
If the unmarried biological father does not strictly comply with the statutory requirements, he uis
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child . . . and his consent to
the adoption of the child is not required." § 78-30-4.14(5). When a child is under six months old
and placed for adoption, as Kenneth was, the biological father must (1) initiate paternity
proceedings in accordance with the Code, (2) file notice of the paternity proceedings with the
state registrar of vital statistics, and (3) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, pay a fair
and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred during the pregnancy and birth. § 78-304.14(2)(b). All of the requirements must be met "prior to the time the mother executes her
consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted these statutory requirements in In re Adoption of
B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). The facts of In re B.B.D. are strikingly similar to the current
case, and this Court finds that the principles of that case apply squarely here as well. The father in
that case "failed to take any action to establish paternity according to [Utah's] statutory scheme,"
id. at 971, and so waived and surrendered any right he had to his child. Similarly, Frank Osborne
did not comply with the first two requirements offilingfor paternity and filing proper notice of
the action with the state of Utah. Angela Baker relinquished her child to Adoption Center on or
about January 4, and Osborne did not file a paternity action until February 11 in North Carolina.
He has still not filed an action in Utah, aside from his petition challenging the jurisdiction of the
Court. Osborne has failed to take any action according to the statutory requirements, and so has
waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise had. Having so waived those rights, the
Court concludes that the information Osborne seeks by the subpoena is of no worth to Mr.
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Osborne.
Adoption Center makes the additional point that it stands as the legal custodian of
Kenneth from the date his mother relinquished him until the time the adoption is finalized. This
assertion is conrect according to Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.22, which states that the childplacing agency has "custody and control" during that period of time. Osborne can assert his
interests directly against Adoption Center and has no need to discover the identities of Kenneth's
adoptive parents.
In oral argument before the court, Osborne attempted to show that the Utah Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101 to
318, applied to deny the Court jurisdiction over the matter before it. In making that argument,
Osborne seemed to be attempting to bifurcate the definition of an "adoption proceeding" into two
separate actions, one a child custody action and the other an action to terminate the parental
rights of the natural parents. However, to make the argument that the UCCJEA applies to the
current proceedings with regard to Kenneth's adoption, Osborne must somehow circumvent § 7845c-103, which clearly states: "This chapter [the UCCJEA] does not govern: (1) an adoption
proceeding . . . " The Court does not agree with Osborne that these proceedings regarding
Kenneth's adoption should properly be construed as anything but an "adoption proceeding" in the
plain language of the statute. The UCCJEA does not apply here, as evidenced by its plain
language.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court concludes that the subpoena of Adoption Center should be
quashed. Adoption Center has a legal duty to keep the contents of the adoption file, including the
names of the adoptive parents, confidential. Because the adoption file is legally protected, the
Court is required to quash or modify any subpoena of its contents absent any exception or waiver.
Osborne, having not strictly complied with the Utah adoption statutes, has not preserved any of
his rights with respect to Kenneth under Utah law, and cannot show good cause why the file
should be opened when he is free to proceed directly against Adoption Center. Therefore,
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Adoption Center's Motion to Quash Subpoena is granted for the reasons stated above.
Adoption Center's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it
for the Court's signature.
DATED this

day of _

fat6(A.

f,

2002,

BY THE COURT
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 26,372

Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, III,

REPLY RE: SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM ON AGENCY'S
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA

A Minor Child.
Case No.020400623
Judge Hansen
The petitioner Frank Osborne here replies to the Adoption Center of Choice's1
response to the supplemental memorandum that Mr. Osborne previously filed in this matter. That
memorandum pointed out to the Court the recent decision of In Re W. A.. 2002 Utah App. 72
(March 7, 2002), and its relevance to the Court's decision as to whether Mr. Osborne is entitled to
identifying information to enable him to serve the adoptive parents with the petition he hasfiledin
this matter.
It is curious that the defendants would argue that In Re W. A does not apply in this case. The
agency appears to argue that In Re W. A only applies in proceedings initially commenced as
termination of parental rights proceedings. The agency ignores that adoption proceedings by their
very nature contemplate both termination and custody adjudications.
1

Throughout this memorandum Mr. Osborne refers to the Adoption Center of Choice as
the "agency."

Adoption is the legal process by which a child acquires parents other
than his natural parents and parents acquire a child under the natural
child. As a result of the adoption decree legal rights and obligations
which formerly existed between the child and his natural parents
come to an end, and are replaced by similar rights and obligations
with respect to his new adoptive parents. It is common, in
considering adoption, to focus attention on the second of the steps,
that is, the formation of the legal bond with the adoptive parents, but
since in our legal system it is generally the case that the parentchild relationship may exist with only one set ofparents at a timef
adoption also necessarily involves the termination of the bond with
the natural parents. In some jurisdictions the two steps are
accomplished by two separate lawsuits, the first being referred to as
a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the second as
adoption. Both steps will be considered in this chapter under the
general heading of adoption.
Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 20.1 at 850 (1988)
(emphasis supplied).
It appears everyone, including the commentators, accept this fundamental maxim - everyone,
that is, except for the agency. But even more important than the commentators are the cases. For
example, in In Re W. A, the court spoke with disapproval of In re Appeal In Maricopa County. 543
P.2d 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975), a termination of parental rights proceeding. That case, in turn, cites
the seminal case of In Re Soderberg. 226 P. 210 (Ariz. 1924), an adoption case famous for refusing
to require personal jurisdiction over a putative natural father. See, e.g.. Clark at § 20.3 at 875 n. 49.
(Copies of the quoted portions of the Clark treatise are attached hereto for the Court's convenience,
as are the non-Utah cases.) This free interchange between adoption and termination of parental
rights cases is but one example of the fact that the principles and concepts discussed in both types
of cases are exactly the same. The termination cases rejecting "status" jurisdiction from Kentucky,
New Mexico, Florida and Delaware (all cited in In Re W. A. at f 24) are accompanied by adoption
cases reaching the same conclusion in Illinois, Donlon v. Miller. 355 N.E.2d 195 (111. App. 1976),

2

and New Jersey, Matter of Adoption of Child by McKinlev, 384 A.2d 920 (N.J. Super. 1978).2
Petitioner's counsel alluded to the fungibility of termination law, whether arising in
affirmative termination cases or in adoption cases, in oral argument on the motion to quash, pointing
out that even though the UCCJEA purports to exclude a adoption proceedings, it specifically
includes proceedings governing termination of parental rights. Thus, in this case where the
fundamental question is the propriety of Utah courts exercising jurisdiction of the subject matter over
Mr. Osborne, and the termination of his parental rights, the UCCJEA does indeed apply. Moreover,
and perhaps more to the point raised in the agency's response. In Re W. A. clearly does apply in any
termination proceedings, whether those arise out of adoption or are initiated independently under
another provision of the Utah code. One should remember that the concern raised by the court in
In Re W. A. was not whether statutory procedures had been followed or were sufficient, but rather
whether the constitutional rights of the father had been properly protected. In Re W. A., 2002 Utah
App. 72 f 7 n. 3 ("[A] violation of long held constitutional protections is not permissible simply
because other procedural safeguards are satisfied.").
Perhaps most disturbing in the agency's response is the absurd contention that Mr. Osborne
may not raise any arguments governing this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him when
he has limited his initial petition to a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. In the colloquy during
oral argument on the motion to quash, Mr. Osborne's counsel felt it would be helpful, even
necessary, to point out to the Court where this dispute could lead. One must recall that the dispute
before the Court is whether to reveal information, and central to the Court's decision with respect
2

These cases clearly rule that the fact that in adoption cases the father's parental status
might be inchoate or otherwise unclear does not affect whether a forum has jurisdiction to
adjudicate that status. That's the key, and it's the premise the agency consistently and
deliberately overlooks in its arguments.
3
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to that decision is the proceeding to which that information will be subject and in which it may be
relevant. If this Court rejects Mr. Osborne's subject matter jurisdiction argument, he fully intends
to challenge this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. The Court should bear this in
mind as it assesses the need to reveal the information requested.3
Throughout its response the agency consistently and somewhat casually assumes that various
provisions of Utah law magically apply to Mr. Osborne. Mr. Osborne is not interested in and is not
affected by title 78 chapter 3a of the Utah code. Mr. Osborne is not interested in and is not affected
by title 62 A chapter 4a of the Utah code. Mr. Osborne is not interested in and is not affected by title
78 chapter 30 of the Utah code. In short, Mr. Osborne is not interested in and is not affected by any
provision of Utah law, except those limited provisions under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the UCCJEA that allow him to challenge any exercise whatsoever of the Utah courts
over his rights. This is true notwithstanding the agency's "legal prestidigitation," In Re W. A.. 2002
Utah App. 72 at f 23 n. 14. to show otherwise.
As a final note, Mr. Osborne is well aware of the constitutional requirements and
responsibilities imposed upon all the actors in this proceeding: him, the adoptive parents, the agency,
and the natural mother. It may well be that an inquiry into whether he has satisfied his constitutional
responsibilities may be warranted. But, as clarified by In Re W. A., Utah is not the place where that
inquiry should occur.

3

The agency mentions in its memorandum its request that Mr. Osborne's petition be
dismissed. This request has never been reduced to motion, and is not properly before the Court.
In the event it is brought before the Court, it should be properly briefed and be subject to oral
argument, inasmuch as it is a dispositive motion. Mr. Osborne would note that should the Court
be inclined to dismiss the petition, he be granted leave to amend with his personal jurisdiction
challenges mentioned above.
4
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inquiry should occur.
Accordingly, the Court should deny the motion to quash and allow service of his petition
upon the adoptive parents. This is after all a modest request and ultimately protects the adoptive
parents' interests.4
DATED this 15th day of March, 2002.

?, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this l£ day of March, 2002.
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Wood & Crapo
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

&77??U<^
SECRETARY
4

As noted in oral argument, the agency is not qualified to protect the adoptive parents'
interests in this matter. There is an inherent conflict of interest between the agency and the
parents, since if the adoption goes awry the parents may have a claim against the agency. The
parents' interests are therefore not well served within the current posture.
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone-(801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No 26,372

Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, III,
A Minor Child.

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM,
BASED ON NEW AUTHORITY,
OPPOSING MOTION TO QUASH
SUBPOENA
Case No.020400623
Judge Hansen

The Court has before it, and under advisement, the Adoption Center of Choice's Motion to
Quash Subpoena, a subpoena issued by petitioner which seeks information regarding Kenneth Skyler
Baker III. Particularly, petitioner requests the identity of the adoptive parents so they may be served,
along with information in the adoption file so as to perfect his jurisdictional challenge thereto.
The Court may recall that in oral argument and in his petition the petitioner restricted his
argument to a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, but that should subject matter jurisdiction be
found, petitioner would bring due process challenges to the application of Utah law to him in this
matter.
The Utah Court of Appeals decided yesterday the case of In re W.A., 2002 UT App. 72
(March 7,2002), wherein the court reversed a lower court ruling that Utah state courts could exercise
jurisdiction over a nonresident father to terminate his parental rights. Adoption has a tennination

component directly affecting petitioner (whose rights have purportedly been terminated by a Utah
County), and so the case applies here.
The W.A. court ruled as follows:
1.

Father had established minimum contacts with Utah because he allowed child to be
cared for by Utah state agencies. This constituted purposeful availment. [Here, there
is arguably no purposeful availment, since Kenneth was kidnaped by his mother and
transported to Utah].

2.

The Utah long-arm statute failed to apply, however, because father had never been
in Utah, conducted business in Utah, committed a tortuous injury in Utah, or owned
or used real property in Utah. [Here, these same facts obtain].

3.

Alternatively. Utah could not assert jurisdiction over father under the so-called
"status" exception that has perpetuated itself in U.S. Supreme Court rulings since
Pennover v. Neff, most recently articulated in footnote 30 in Shaffer v. Heitnen 433
U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977). That case indicates that states may adjudicate the status
of certain relationships between parties. While some states have deemed the
relationship between parent and child as a relationship governed by "status"
jurisdiction, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected this notion, citing the fundamental
liberty interest at stake in parenthood. The court then concluded that without
personal jurisdiction, the predicate findings required to terminate parental rights
could not be made. [Here, the Court would be required to make certainfindingsas
to the father's conduct so as to terminate his rights incident to the adoption, and,
lacking personal jurisdiction, it cannot do so. Thus, the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction.]
2

1

Under In re W.A., it appears that status jurisdiction in termination of parental rights cases,
and adoption cases a fortiori, is dead. This is a watershed case in the world of interstate custody,
adoption and termination cases, and places major constraints on extraterritorial application of Utah's
adoption code. It may very well eliminate the long-standing and reprehensible practice of Utah being
a clearinghouse for natural mothers and adoptive parents who take refuge in Utah in order to divest
foreign fathers of their parental rights. In any event, petitioner contends that it clearly and
convincingly demonstrates his likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and justifies giving him the
information he now seeks.
The court should allow the subpoena to go forward and require the Adoption Center to reveal
to his counsel the identity of the adoptive parents and the contents of the adoption file of child Baker.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2002.

PfflLLI^tOWRY,^
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne

3

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this ^
day of March, 2002.
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Wood & Crapo
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84603
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necessary for him to attempt to establish his rights regarding the child. Indeed, he has not even
established that he is the father.
II.

MR. OSBORNE HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHTS TO THE CHILD.
Assuming Mr. Osborne is a putative father of the child, which has not been

established, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14, an unmarried biological father, such as Mr.
Osborne, is "deemed" to have "waived and surrendered any right in relation to [his] child" if he
does not "fully and strictly comply" with several statutory conditions to establishing and
protecting his parental rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5) (emphasis added). These
conditions are: the unmarried biological father must (1) "initiate proceedings to establish
paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity"; (2) "file with th[e] court a
sworn affidavit stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the child"; (3)
"set[] forth his plans for care of the child"; (4) "agreef] to a court order of child support and the
payment of expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth";
(5) "file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the state registrar of vital
statistics within the Department of Health"; and (6) "if he had actual knowledge of the
pregnancy, pa[yj a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b).3
Importantly, all of these conditions must be performed by the unmarried birth
father "prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to

3

These six conditions apply to an unmarried biological father's rights to a child
who has been placed for adoption within six months of the child's birth. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(b). The child that is the subject of this case was placed for adoption about five
months after his birth.
4

a licensed chid-placing agency." Id at § 78-30-4.14(b) (emphasis added). If he does not "fully
and strictly comply with each of the[se] conditions" he "is deemed to have waived and
surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the right to notice of any judicial
proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the
child is not required." Id. § 78-30-4.14(b)(5) (emphasis added).
The legal effect of an unwed birth father's failure to comply with these provisions
was recently examined and upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in In re Adoption ofB.B.D., 984
P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). The birth father in In re B.B.D. was a resident of Washington who had
impregnated his girlfriend after they began dating. Unlike this case, there was no doubt he was
the father. Shortly after finding out about her pregnancy, the birth mother discussed with the
birth father the options regarding their unborn child's future. One option included placing the
child for adoption with the birth mother's brother and sister-in-law, who resided in American
Fork, Utah. The birth father was opposed to this option at the outset of their discussions. Id.
at 969.
The birth mother and birth father ended their relationship several months before
the birth of the child. At about the same time of their break-up, the birth mother informed the
birth father that she had spoken with lawyers in Washington and Utah regarding the placement of
her child for adoption. The birth father again expressed his opposition to that proposal. Shortly
before the birth of the child, the birth mother informed the birth father that she was flying to Utah
to stay with her brother and sister-in-law, to give birth, and to place the child with them for
adoption. The birth father continued to express his opposition to the proposed adoption. Id
at 969.
5

In opposing the adoption, the birth father went to the Division of Social and
Health Services in Washington in an attempt to establish paternity by registration. He was
informed, however, that he could not establish paternity until after the child's birth. On
October 25, 1996, the child was born in American Fork, Utah. Id at 969-70.
On October 28, 1996, the birth mother signed her consent to the adoption,
relinquished her parental rights, and placed the child with the adoptive parents. On that same
day, the adoptive parents filed their petition to adopt. The birth father learned about the adoption
proceedings on November 6, 1996, and on November 11,1996, he went to the Domestic
Relations Division in Washington to fill out a paternity questionnaire. Shortly thereafter, the
birth father received notice from the Division that it lacked jurisdiction over the child because the
child was born in Utah. The birth father did not file a paternity action in either Washington or
Utah. Id at 969-70.
On November 26, 1996, the birth father filed a letter of opposition to the adoption
proceeding with the district court and on December 20, 1996, he filed an "Answer and
Counterclaim" for custody of the child. The adoptive parents filed a motion to dismiss the
Answer and Counterclaim, which was treated as a motion for summary judgment. The adoptive
parents' motion was granted by the district court because the birth father had failed to follow
Utah's statutory scheme for establishing paternity and, as such, he had no legal standing to
contest the child's adoption. See id. at 970. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling, and
the case was granted certiorari review by the Utah Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, the birth father argued that his parental rights were
protected by the constitution and could not be terminated without a showing of unfitness
6

pursuant to the termination code. The Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile it is true that the
relationship between parent and child is afforded some protection by the federal and state
constitutions,... the rights of parents are commensurate with the responsibilities they have
assumed, and in the case of unmarried fathers, a biological relationship alone is insufficient to
establish constitutionally protected parental rights." In re B.B.D., 984 P.2d at 970. The court
continued:
Under Utah law, "an unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that
acquires constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and
upon the child's birth" An unmarried father demonstrates his commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood "by providing appropriate medical care and
financial support, and by establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the
requirements of [Utah law]." If an unmarried father fails to adhere to these
requirements, including taking the necessary steps to establish paternity, "his
biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in
constitutional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by his failure to
strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate it."
Id. at 970 (emphasis added; citations omitted; alteration in quoted opinion).
The Supreme Court carefully distinguished between the rights of the birth mother
and the rights of the unmarried birth father with regard to terminating the birth father's rights and
the placing of a child for adoption. It stated:
The unmarried mother, because she is "faced with the responsibility of making
crucial decisions about the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and
has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future and
the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance regarding the permanence of an
adoptive placement." [Utah Code Ann.] § 78-30-4.12(2)(b). An unmarried father,
on the other hand, "by virtue of the fact that he has engaged in a sexual
relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an
adoption proceeding regarding that child may occur." [Utah Code Ann.]
§ 78-30-4.13(1). Because he is deemed to be on notice, it becomes his
responsibility to protect his own rights . . . according to the requirements of
section 78-30-4.13 to 4.15 . . . . If an unmarried father fails to "fully and strictly
7

comply" with the [requirements of section 78-30-4.13 to -4.15], he "is deemed to
have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child."
M a t 971.
In applying these principles to the facts in B.B.D., the Supreme Court found that
the birth father, while from Washington, had done none of the things required under Utah law to
establish his parental rights to the child. The father knew his girlfriend was pregnant, knew that
she had gone to Utah to have the baby, and knew that she was considering placing the baby for
adoption. Id. at 971. Despite this, the birth father "failed to take any action to establish paternity
according to [Utah's] statutory scheme." Id. As a result, the birth father waived and surrendered
any right he had to his child. Id. It did not matter that the birth father was a non-resident of
Utah, since the birth father had subjected himself to the jurisdiction of Utah's courts by seeking
custody and visitation of the child. Id at 973-74.
In this case, Mr. Osborne has done nothing required by Utah law to establish his
parental rights. The child was born in Utah and has a Utah birth certificate. See Exhibit C. Mr.
Osborne surely knew this if he claims to be the father. Like the birth father in the B.B.D.
decision, Mr. Osborne failed to take timely, let alone any, action to establish paternity according
to Utah's statutory scheme. Neither the Court nor Adoption Center even knows whether he is the
actual father of the child. As such, he is deemed to have waived all rights with respect to the
child. Having waived all such rights, the information sought by the subpoena is of no worth to
Mr. Osborne and the subpoena should be quashed pursuant to Rule 45(c)(3) as creating an undue
burden on both the Adoption Center and the adoptive parents.
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The
Adoption*
C enter*f Choice
RELINQUISHMENT
I, Angela Wilkinson Baker, beingfirstduly sworn on oath depose and say:
I am the parent of a baby boy, namely Kenneth Skyler Baker HI, born on the 06dl day of August, 2001 at
Timpanogas Regional Hospital in the city of Orem, state of Utah.
I am not an enrolled member of a Native American tribe or of an Alaskan Village tribe and, to the best of
my knowledge; I ami not eligible for membership in a Native American tribe or an Alaskan Village tribe.
I am not and was not married at the time of conception to the birth father,
I do hereby relinquish and surrender said child for adoption to:
The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.
241 West 520 North Orem, UT 84057
an organization licensed by the Department of Social Services, State of Utah, to find homes for children
and to place children in homes for adoption. It is fully understood by me that when this relinquishment is
signed, all my rights; to the custody, services and earnings for said minor child and any responsibility for
the care and support of said minor child wiJI be terminated.

Angela Wi^inson Baker

Date

gency Representative

Time

'

Notary
State of
County of

J

J

^

On this <^$\ day otC^g/J/j^
, 200k
fl/l/Wfl
^fid^L*
, personally
u
appeared before me (^YJJ^$}AJI
{A^^J^AJf^—~
, a sworn Notary Public in and
for said county and stat£/who is personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactoiy evidence) to
be the same person whose name is subscribed to this instrument and signed the foregoing document in my presence
and who swore or affirmed to me that their signature was voluntary and the document truthful.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed by official seal the day and year in which diis
certificate was first above written.

i&AfsCmlerst
JUUENEANOER81N
Notary fMMo
Stale of Utah
*fcn Expire** Mar. 30,3006
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The

Adoption^
CenteryfChoice
Statement of Understanding
Please Initial

'to

to
to
Mb

I Fully understand that:
1.

As the birth parent, I have the primary right to parent this child, even if 1 am a minor.
>

2.

There may be services and sources of financial assistance in the community which could
be made available to me should I choose to parent this child.

3.

I have the right to know that the agency has the sole discretion to determine the
placement of this child but nothing in this statement shall deny a birth parent(s) request
for an identified placement.

4.

Legislation has made it possible for children relinquished for adoption to obtain
knowledge regarding their birth parents. :

5.

I am aware of the Utah Voluntary Consent Registry coordinated through the Utah
Department of Vital Statistics that allows me to register my wish to be placed in contact
with my child once he/she is of age if he/she also chooses to register.

6.

1 hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which may be held in courts of the
State of Utah, or elsewhere, in connection with the adoption of this child.

7.

My decision torelinquishthis child for adoption has been made voluntarily and of my
own free will, without any coercion, force or duress from anyone including
representatives of The Adoption Center oif Choice, Inc. 1 have received or been offered
a copy of this document.

8.

I am not under the influence of any drugs, alcohol or medication that might affect my
reasoning or judgment.

9.

1 understand that if 1 choose adoption for my child and sign the relinquishing papers, all
ray rights and responsibilities for this child will be ended, and that my consent is final
and legally binding.
J have read and understood this statement of understanding.

ild(l.

hntc/2.

7-V-64

ela WfUanson Baker

Date

r->

"foh/Uldk-^
Witness
Tel 801 224-2440
Fax 801 2244899

QtiikkxlkfllMiflS

H£J UU I

Mto*,)*tk OTSE3ESEJiaiia>
ummmrammm

Utah B i r t h C e r t i f i c a t i o n
Kenneth Skyler Baker III
Name of Child
Male
Sex o f

August

Child

6,

Data o f

2001

21:48

Sixth

Time o f

0 6 Lbs 0 3

Timpanogos R e g i o n a l H o s p i t a l
Place of Birth

oz

B i r t h Weight

Birth

Orexa
City of

Birth

James Br i n t o n , M.D.

Utah

Birth Attendant

County of Birth

Is

Angela Catherine Wilkinson
* Mbther Vs Maiden Name

Becember 27, 1974
Mother's Date of Birth

Charlotte

N o r t h C a r o l i n a >• */f x> ^
Mother's Residence S t a t e / ^ a h t ^ # "

Mother's Residence City
,^rAugust 13, 2001
Date o£ R e g i s t r a t i o n

2001

29401

F i l e Number

SSA Card I ^ q ^ s t e d

December 2 8 , 2 0 0 1
Date Issued

lp this office. Thie certified copy is issued
f-1S53 As Amended.

^ ? Vrritoje to certify that
Uttxwjty'of

If" " ' *J&J&'\
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>R O F VITAL R E C O R D S

By fe^
^
&*
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COUNTY HEALTH tt
)F VITAL RECORDS
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The
Adoption
CenterlfChoice
RELINQUISHMENT

On this 7 ^

day

<£U/L{/^MJ

20 /? L

The Adoption CenterM Choice, fflc.
hereby signifies its willingness to accept the annexedfrelinquishment
and to accept said child for adoption.
By.
Agency Officj

The undersigned, Donny Baker after being duly placed under oath represents that
he is married to, Angela Wilkinson Baker. Angela delivered a baby boy, Kenneth
Skyler Baker HI, on the 06th day of August, 2001. I fully understand that I am giving
up any parental rights I may have for said child, as well as any obligations I may have due
and owing to said minor child
L I irrevocably consent to the adoption and submit to the jurisdiction of the
Courts of the State of Utah and acknowledge and agree that all matters relating to
the adoption of the child, including, but not limited to, the revocability or
irrevocability of the consent to the adoption, shall be determined in accordance
with the laws of the State of Utah.
2. I further represent that this consent to adoption proceedings is given of my
ownfreewill, without duress, and with full knowledge of the consequences of
giving the same and that prior to executing this consent for adoption, I have had
an opportunity to read said consent, and fully understand the terms hereof I
further represent that I am not under the influence of any medication or drugs
, which would impair my ability to reason and make decisions.
3.1 understand and acknowledge that the laws for the State of Utah will prevail in
all regards for this adoption, and specifically for the taking of this consent.
4. I am not an enrolled member of an Indian tribe or of an Alaskan Village and, to
the best of my knowledge, I am not eligible for membership in an Indian tribe or
an Alaskan Village.
5. I was married to the birth mother at the time of conception. I understand that it
is necessary under Utah Statute for me to consent to these adoption proceedings.
Tel 801 224-2440
Fax 801224*1899

6, I believe the adoption of the child would be in the best interests of the
child. I have had enough time to carefully consider whether or not adoption is
in my best interest and the best interest of the child. I have given careful thought
to my decision to proceed with the adoption.
7. I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS CONSENT TO ADOPTION IS FINAL
AND LEGALLY BINDING. AND MAY NOT BE REVOKED BY ME.
>•

DATED this / T ^ d a v of

S*^

,20(J*L
\

lonny Baker
Donny

NOTARY'S CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that the foregoing Consent to Adoption was signed in my
presence by Donny Baker on V ^ ^ . ^
fg
20Q!^4nd that prior to signing said
consent, the said parent of the *&ove nam#l minor children appeared before me; that he
was by me duly sworn on oath; that he was then and there examined by me; that he freely
signed the same and said document is a true and accurate reflection of his testimony.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this y ^ d a y of

Notary Public
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY P U B L I C
STATE OF UTAH
My Commission Expires
Nqvwi&flM 1,2004
SANDRA W.bAVIS

I certify that this is a true copy of an original
document sent to the aeeocy with a raised seal

5-34)-©V

241 West 520 North

Oram, Utah 84057

Sandra W. Davis, Notary Public

Date

GQ

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
__
CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH
FOR NOTICE OF THE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY
Name of Mother
Angela Wilkinson (Baker)
(Place of Chikfs Birth
fOrem UT

Date of Child's Birth or Estimated Birth Date
August 6 , 20CJ1

Sex of Child
Male

This is to certify that a search has been made of the file of Notices of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity
and/or the father's name is reported on the birth certificate with the Office of Vftal Records and Statistics, and no record
was found to be on file.
If a Notice of the Initiation of Proceedings to Establish Paternity is found on file or the father's name is reported on the
birth certificate, a certified copy will be issued. If no record is on file, a CERTIFICATE OF SEARCH is issued.

January 7, 2002
Date
~

10:52 AM
Time

State Registrar
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120'East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 26,372

Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
SUBPOENA
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, III,
A Minor Child.

Case No.020400623
Judge Hansen

THE STATE OF UTAH SENDS GREETINGS TO:
James Webb
Registered Agent
The Adoption Center of Choice
241 West 520 North
Orem, UT 84057
WE COMMAND YOU, that all and singular business and excuses being laid aside, you
appear and attend a deposition before a Certified Shorthand Reporter at the offices of Howard,
Lewis & Petersen, on Friday, the 1st day of March, 2002, at 10:00 a.m., then and there to
testify, at the taking of your deposition, in the above-entitled action now pending in said District
Court on the part of respondents and disobedience will be punished as a contempt by said Court.

r- r\

Said deposition will concern an adoption petition that concerns one Kenneth Skyler Baker,
III, and said petition may contain the following information:
a.

Child's name: KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, III

b.

State of Residence or Birth Certificate: NORTH CAROLINA

c.

Natural Mother executing consent: ANGELA BAKER

' d.

Natural Father: FRANK OSBORNE, JR.

e.

Adoption Agency: ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE

f.

Date of Petition: AFTER JANUARY 6, 2002

g.

Date of Birth: AUGUST 6, 2001;

In said deposition, you will be asked to provide the following:
(a) the name and address of adoptive parents therein;
(b) the attorneys involved in the filing of the adoption petition;
(c) the county in which the adoption petition has been filed, and the name of all
judges who have issued any rulings or orders in the adoption case, and the case number of the
adoption case.
This subpoena amends and replaces the previous subpoena served on James Webb on
February 20, 2002.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2002.

N

/ A (W:

PHKLIP~E. fcOWRY, for ~
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne
J:\PEL\OSBORNE2.SUB
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No

Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m,
A Minor Child.

VERIFIED PETITION
CHALLENGING SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. SECTION 78-45c-109
Case No.

Judge

i^/m^jry

Division # «—)
Petitioner Frank Osborne here files this petition with the Court challenging its subject
matter jurisdiction to enter a custody determination/adoption decree over petitioner's son, Kenneth
Skyler Baker, HI. This petition is brought under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101, et al.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Petitioner is a resident of Gaston County, North Carolina.

2.

There are three potential respondents to this petition. The first is the Adoption

Center of Choice, a Utah corporation whose principal place of business is in Utah County, Utah. The
other two respondents are the adoptive parents, whose identity is unknown, but who are believed to
be Utah residents.

3.

On November 19,2000, petitioner met Angela Baker, the birth mother. Petitioner

struck up a relationship with Angela Baker and at the end of November, 2000, petitioner moved into
Ms. Baker's home.
4.

At this time, Ms. Baker had a two-year-old son, DJ. Petitioner developed a

parental relationship with DJ. that has persisted to the present date.
5.

On December 10, 2000, Ms. Baker informed petitioner that she was pregnant.

Petitioner resolved at that time to provide for the new child and regarded the new child, Ms. Baker
and Ms. Baker's son, DJ., as a family unit for which he was responsible.
6.

On January 12,2001, petitioner bought a new home located at 1201 Alberto Lane

in Stanley, North Carolina. Petitioner moved into this home along with Ms. Baker and D J. At this
point, petitioner's relationship with D J. matured to the point that D J. called petitioner "Dad."
7.

In February, 2001, Ms. Baker was instructed by her doctor to be on bed rest

because her pregnancy was regarded by her physician as being high risk. She followed the doctor's
instructions and continued to live in the home Mr. Osborne has purchased.
8.

Mr. Osborne maintained the home and provided for Ms. Baker and D J. Ms. Baker

was not employed during the pregnancy from February forward.
9.

Ms. Baker continued to live in petitioner's home through July, 2001. It was during

this month that Ms. Baker first called an adoption agency called An Act of Love. Petitioner
discovered that she had made contact with the adoption agency and expressed his disapproval. Ms.
Baker represented at that point that she would not place the baby for adoption and attributed her
actions to the fact that her psychiatric medications were apparently not working properly. Later that
night, she checked herself into the local mental health center uttering suicide threats.
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10.

After Ms. Baker returned from the mental health center and moved back into the

home, petitioner continued his work schedule. One day at work he was informed by a neighbor that
Ms. Baker and her mother had taken all of their possessions from the home and moved out.
Petitioner contacted Ms. Baker's aunt who informed him that she had flown to Utah where a doctor
had induced labor and where she was about to place the baby for adoption.
11.

On August 6, 2001, Ms. Baker called petitioner at work. She told petitioner that

she had borne a son and that she was coming home with the baby boy and D.J. On August 7,2001,
she traveled back to North Carolina by bus. The child was in Utah for one day.
12.

Upon returning, Ms. Baker went to her mother's home for one week. She then

indicated that she wished to return to the residence the petitioner had purchased. Petitioner and his
father moved Ms. Baker and her mother back into the home.
13.

From August to October, 2001, Ms. Baker, the petitioner, D.J. and Ms. Baker's

mother lived together in petitioner's home. Ms. Baker and the petitioner had a number of
conversations regarding the fact that the child did not bear petitioner's name.
14.

During this time also, Ms. Baker would continue to have episodes of emotional or

psychological distress. She would act out inappropriately and occasionally throw things. Petitioner
ascribed her conduct to her psychological condition.
15.

During this entire time, D.J., Ms. Baker's son, and the baby boy developed a

bonding relationship.
16.

In November and December, 2001, D.J. and the baby continued to develop a

bonding relationship..
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17.

Thanksgiving 2001 was celebrated with Ms. Baker's family. Petitioner cooked and

prepared the Thanksgiving meal. This was at Ms. Baker's family's residence in Stanley, North
Carolina.
18.

In early December, 2001, in an effort to rectify the fact that the child was not

named after petitioner, petitioner twice secured a blank Affidavit for Voluntary Declaration of
Paternity for execution under North Carolina law. Ms. Baker signed both of these documents but
then became distressed and ripped the documents up in front of petitioner.
19.

During the month of December, 2001, petitioner and Ms. Baker's relationship

deteriorated. Even so, petitioner and Ms. Baker continued to cohabit in the petitioner's home, and
petitioner continued to provide for Ms. Baker, D.J. and the baby.
20.

On December 10,2001, the relationship deteriorated to the point that Ms. Baker

took DJ. and the baby and moved out of the house and took many of the possessions of both Ms.
Baker and the petitioner with her.
21.

On December 15,2001, Ms. Baker contacted the petitioner's mother and asked if

she could take the baby to the hospital for an ear infection and respiratory distress. She also
indicated that she needed those items that she was accustomed to the petitioner providing (diapers,
gas drops, formula, etc.). Petitioner complied with these requests.
22.

On December 28, 2001, Ms. Baker came to petitioner's home and picked up

Christmas presents that had been purchased by the petitioner for both D.J. and for the baby.
23.

December 28,2001, was the last time that the petitioner has seen the baby. In early

January, 2002, he received a call from Ms. Baker, and she left a message on his answering machine
stating that she was going to Utah, and that he "had no chance in hell" of getting him back because
the petitioner could not fight the State of Utah and could not win there.
4

24.

At this juncture, petitioner called the Department of Social Services in Gastonia,

North Carolina and spoke with Patricia L. Hovis, an employee of that office, regarding adoption
placement.
25.

On or about January 4, 2002, Ms. Baker left North Carolina for Utah, where she

arranged to place the child for adoption. Upon returning she informed petitioner that she had placed
the child for adoption with an adoption agency called The Adoption Center of Choice. Petitioner
contacted The Adoption Center of Choice for information regarding the adoption and was given
none.
26.

All of the petitioner's information regarding the pendency of the adoption has come

from Ms. Baker.
27.

In his communication with The Adoption Center of Choice, petitioner was

informed that the child had been placed with a set of adoptive parents located in the State of Utah.
This communication was confirmed by further representations made by the adoptive mother, Ms.
Baker.
28.

Petitioner alleges and believes that the adoptive parents and/or The Adoption

Center of Choice have filed a petition for adoption of the child in Utah for purposes of placing the
child with a set of Utah residents as adoptive parents.
29.

Respondents agency and/or adoptive parents failed to secure the approval of the

North Carolina or Utah administrator of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children before
the filing of the adoption petition in question.
30.

On February 11, 2002, the petitioner commenced a paternity and custody action

by filing Verified Complaint with the North Carolina General Court of Justice, District Court
Division, Case No. 02-CvD-478, Gaston County, North Carolina. A copy of the complaint is
5

attached as Exhibit A. The address of the court is Clerk of Superior Court, Att'n: Civil, P.O. Box
340, Gastonia, N.C. 28053, and the telephone number for the court is (704) 852-3100.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction)
31.

Petitioner incorporates previous allegations of this petition consistent with this

32.

The governing law in this matter is Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101, et al., otherwise

count.

known as the Utah Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act.
33.

The Act provides for specific remedies in instances where custody of a child

transported between states is at issue.
34.

Adoption proceedings are specifically covered under the provisions of the Act and

under the applicable precedent of the Utah Court of Appeals.
3 5.

Specifically, the code defines a child custody proceeding as a proceeding in which

legal custody, physical custody or parent-time with respect to a child is at issue, including a
proceeding for a divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination
of parental rights, and protection from the domestic violence in which the issue may appear. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45c-102(4).
36.

The code differentiates between a child's home state and states that are not the

child's home state. A home state is defined as a state in which a child lived with a parent or a person
acting as a parent for at least consecutive months. In the case of a child less than six months of age,
the term means the state in which the child livedfrombirth with any of the persons mentioned. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45c-102(7).
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37.

As alleged above, before the Utah adoption petition was filed the child subject of

this petition had lived his entire life in the State of North Carolina, with the exception of the first day
of his life. He had lived that time with the natural mother, Angela Baker, his natural brother, and
his natural father, Frank Osborne, petitioner herein.
38.

Petitioner, by making this petition to the Court and by appearing herein, does not

subject himself to the personal jurisdiction of the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-109(l)
provides that a party to a child custody proceeding who is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this
state and is a responding party under the jurisdictional provisions of the statute does not subject him
or herself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. This creates a statutorily specific modification to
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12 provisions allowing for what were once termed "special
appearances." Petitioner, at this juncture, confines his petition for relief only to the jurisdictional
issue, but reserves the right to pursue other remedies in the event this Court rules it has jurisdiction.
Those remedies are not asserted at this time. Petitioner specifically alleges that he is not subject to
the personal jurisdiction of the Utah courts for purposes of the Utah courts' exercising and applying
Utah adoption laws specifically to him. Petitioner contends that this Court must first make a
determination of its jurisdiction and that the Court cannot make a determination that it has
jurisdiction simply by virtue of his challenging that jurisdiction under § 78-45c-109.
39.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-201, this Court may exercise jurisdiction only if

it is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home
state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is
absent jfrom the state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45c-201(l)(a). Such facts do not exist in this case inasmuch as the child's home
state is North Carolina and both of the child's parents have lived in North Carolina with the child
7

since shortly after the child's birth. (Petitioner also alleges, infra, that no valid proceeding has been
commenced, save the petition for paternity filed in North Carolina, because of several violations of
Utah law).
40.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204, a court of this state has temporary emergency

jurisdiction if a child is present in the state and it is "necessary in an emergency" to protect the child
because of actual or threatened mistreatment or abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(l). These
facts do not apply in this case.
41.

Even were this Court to find that it could exercise temporary emergency

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(l), that jurisdiction is both "temporary" and
"emergency." Accordingly, the code provides that this Court may exercise jurisdiction only until
such time as an order is obtained from the child's home state regarding custody. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45c-204(2).
42.

With respect to actions that have not yet been reduced to order but are still pending,

the code provides that a court of this state that has been asked to make a child custody determination
under the temporary emergency jurisdiction provision, upon being informed that a child custody
proceeding has been commenced, shall immediately communicate with the other court. If this Court
determines it has temporary emergency jurisdiction, Petitioner here requests that the Court
immediately contact the North Carolina court in Case No. 02-CvD-478 (address and phone number
above) for purposes of resolving any emergency the Court may define as existent, to protect the
safety of the parties (including the petitioner) and the child, and to otherwise make findings and
conclusions with respect to the duration of any temporary custody order this Court may deem it has
jurisdiction to issue pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204. The communication requirement
is stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(4). (Nonetheless, petitioner here reiterates and contends
8

that this Court has no jurisdiction to exercise under § 78-45c-204 as there is no emergent situation)
43.

The code also specifically states that if this Court, after its communication with the

North Carolina court, determines that the North Carolina court is exercising its jurisdiction in the
custody proceeding substantially in conformity with the provisions of the Utah Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (or its predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act), then this Court shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state.
This defers to the North Carolina court to let it make the determination as to whether it is the state
that is the more appropriate forum. If it so concludes, this Court must dismiss the proceeding. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45c-206(2).
44.

Timing of the proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-206 is relevant, but

only if there is a proper preceding case regarding custody that sounds appropriately under the Act.
In this instance, one cannot claim that the Utah proceeding is a proper custody proceeding under the
Act because of this Court's lack ofjurisdiction under § 78-45c-201 through -203, as alleged above.
Therefore, the priority of this Court's proceeding cannot be used to bootstrap this Court's jurisdiction.
(This is the fundamental policy behind the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement
Act: to prevent interstate parental kidnaping and forum shopping in a race to the courthouse.)
45.

Jurisdiction of this Court is further improper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-208

which vests this Court with discretion to decline exercised jurisdiction by virtue of the unjustifiable
conduct of the individual invoking the jurisdiction of the Court. In this instance, the natural mother
unilaterally uprooted her child from his home of five months and away from his natural father and
brother, transported him to Utah and placed him with an indiscriminate adoption agency. Utah was
"therightplace" because of its strict adoption code and relative ease of terminating a father's parental
right, the constitutionality of which in this particular case is suspect on a variety of fronts. These
9

indisputable facts reveal a plot by the natural mother and adoption agency that is, at best, unseemly
and, at worst, illegal.
46.

For these reasons, the Court should deem the adoption petition as filed in bad faith

in that the conduct of the adoption agency and the adoptive parents is unjustifiable and, therefore,
should decline to exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-208.
47.

The custody proceeding at issue in this matter (namely, the adoption petition which

this petition collaterally attacks) is further void and of no effect as to the petitioner because the
petitioner received no notice thereof nor was served with proceed therein. The Utah Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act contains specific notice provisions regarding custody
determinations. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-205. The code specifically states that "this chapter does
not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice and an
opportunity to be heard." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-205(2).
48.

The custody proceeding at issue in this matter (namely, the adoption petition which

this petition collaterally attacks) is further void and of no effect because of the respondents' failure
to comply with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, adopted by Utah at U.C. A. §
62A-4a-701. The North Carolina Compact Administrator has officially protested the violation of
the Compact (a copy of the protest is attached as Exhibit B). Such a violation constitutes a violation
of the laws of the State of Utah, and renders void the filing of the adoption petition in question.
49.

Section 78-45c-308 of the code allows for expedited enforcement of child custody

determinations. Petitioner here requests that the Court immediately schedule a hearing on the issue
of whether it has jurisdiction over custody of this child. The code specifically states that the hearing
in question shall be held on the next judicial day following the service or process, unless that date
is impossible. In that event, the Court shall hold the hearing on thefirstday possible. Petitioner here
10

requests such a hearing, demanding that the defendant parties, specifically, the adoptive parents and
a representative of the adoption agency, appear. As part of the relief demanded, petitioner requests
that the identity of the adoptive parents be revealed immediately, before the hearing, pursuant to this
Court's authority to grant relief under U.C.A. § 78-30-15 to open the Utah adoption file so that
service of process may be immediately effected.
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WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows:
1.

That the adoption file in this matter to be opened so as to effect service on the
respondents and to investigate the pending proceedings;

2.

That this court declare that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the pending
adoption proceeding, or that it decline to exercise jurisdiction;

3.

That upon finding it has no jurisdiction or that it declines jurisdiction, that it
communicate this result to the Superior Court of Gaston County, North Carolina,
so that that court may make an appropriate determination of custody over the child;

4.

That upon such court reaching a custody determination (whether such custody be
vested in an individual or the North Carohna Department of Social Services, and
whether it be temporary or permanent), that this Court vest such determination
with full faith and credit after proper registration of the North Carolina court order
in the State of Utah, and this Court at that time enforce said order by issuing such
writs as it deems proper, including a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Utah
UCCJEA.

DATED this / r

day of February, 2002.

.COWRY.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )
: ss.
COUNTY OF GASTON
)
Frank Osborne, Jr., being duly sworn, states that he is the petitioner in the above-entitled
action, that he has read the foregoing petition and that the statements contained therein are true
and accurate to the best of his own personal knowledge, inforniation and belief.

\3

of:February, 2001
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ^-~> day of

2L

NOTARY PUBLIC
Notary Public, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina
My Commission Expires January 25,2004
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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Gaston

•

County
0

Nome Of

oa-cvp-

f^P,

In The General Court Of Just
District D Superior Court Divi

Plaintiff

Frank Edward Osborne, Jr.
Address

CIVIL SUMMONS
City. Stat a. Zip

G S 1 A-1 Rult

VERSUS
Name Of

Defandentfsr

Q

Angela Catherine Baker

Alias and Piunes Summons

Data Last Summons

Issued

To Each Of The Defandont(e) Named Below:
Nam§ And Addntss

Of Dafandant

Nam* And Address Of Dafandant 2

1

Angela Catherine Baker
9711 Willilyn U n a
Charlotte, NC 28214

A Civil Action Has Been Commenced Against You!
You are notified to appear and answer the complaint of the plaintiff as follows:
1. Serve a copy of your written enswer to the complaint upon the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney within thirty (3(
days after you have been served. You may serve your answer by delivering a copy to the plaintiff or by maili
to the plaintiff's la3t known address, and
2. File the original of the written answer with the Clerk of Superior Court of the county named above.
If you fail to answer the complaint, the plaintiff will apply to the Court for the relief demanded in the complaint.
Nmmm And Addraas

Of Plaintiff's

Attorney

(if Nona. Addraaa

Of Plaintiff!

Richard B. Schultz
P. 0. Box 1232

Gastonia, North Carolina 28053

•

ENDORSEMENT
This Summons was originally issued on the date
indicated above and returned not served. At the
request of the plaintiff, the time within which this
Summons must be served Is extended thirty (30)
days.

NOTE TO PARTIES:

Tim a

Data Of Endorsement

DAM

D

Signature

I

I Deputy

CSC

Lj

Assistant

CSC

LJ

Clark Of Superior Coi

Many counties have MANDATORY ARBITRATION programs in which most cases where the amount in controversy n
SI 5,000 or Its* are hoard by on arbitrator before a trial. The parties will be notified if this cese is assigned for mane
arbitration, and, if 30. what procedure is to be followed.

AOC-CV-100
Rov 9/96

(Over)

*1997 Administrative Office of \he Courts
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Br
FRANK

EOUARO

OSBORNE,

PLAINTIFF,
C

O

N

P

L

A

X

N

T

-veANQELA

CATHERINE

BAKER,

DEFENDANT.

THE
eay e

PLAINTIFF.

complaining

of

the

Defendant,

alleges

and

ae f prl.i.oue.i--.

1.
The Plaintiff
ie a o l t i x e n
and
reeidant
of
Qa«ton
C o u n t y , N o r t h C a r o l i n a , and h a e b e e n e u c h for m o r e t h a n six (6)
monthe
next
immediately
preceding
the
commencement
of
thie
action.
2.
County,

T h e O e f e n d a n t ie a
North Carolina,

citizen

and

resident

of

Mecklenburg

3.
T h e P l a i n t i f f and the D e f e n d a n t h a v e n e v e r b e e n l a w f u l l y
m a r r i e d j h o w e v e r ,; i t h e y are the n a t u r a l and b i o l o g i c a l p a r e n t e of
o n e m i n o r c h i l d , to u l t i
Kenneth Skylar B a k e r , III, born August
6, 2 0 0 1 , in O r a m , U t a h .
4.
F a c t e e x i s t w h i c h J u e t i f y the C o u r t e of the S t a t e of
N o r t h C a r o l i n a to a e e u m e J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c u s t o d y i s s u e s in
this
oauee
of a o t l o n ,
pursuant
to t h e U n i f o r m
C h i l d - C u e tody
J u r i s d i c t i o n and E n f o r c e m e n t A c t , ae c o d i f i e d by C h a p t e r 50A of
the N o r t h C a r o l i n a G e n e r a l S t a t u t e s .
5.
U n t i l J u s t p r i o r to the b i r t h of s a i d m i n o r c h i l d , the
P l a i n t i f f and t h e O e f e n d a n t
lived
together
at the P l a i n t i f f ' s
r e s i d e n c e at 1 2 0 1 A l b e r t o L a n e , S t a n l e y , N o r t h C a r o l i n a , for m o r e
than six (6) m o n t h e .
6.
Just
prior
to the b i r t h
of said
minor
child,
the
D e f e n d a n t w e n t to t h e S t a t e of U t a h f o r r e a 6 o n 6 w h i c h w e r e then
u n k n o w n to t h e P l a i n t i f f ; t h a t a l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r
giving
b i r t h to e a i d m i n o r c h i l d on A u g u s t 6, 2 0 0 1 , the D e f e n d a n t got on
a b u e In t h e 9 t a t e o f U t a h w i t h e a i d m i n o r c h i l d for the n e x t
t h r e e (3) d a y s and r e t u r n e d to the S t a t e of N o r t h C a r o l i n a j that
the D e f e n d a n t and e a l d m i n o r c h i l d a r r i v e d b a c k In N o r t h C a r o l i n a
on A u g u s t 9, 2 0 0 1 j t h a t f r o m A u g u s t 9, 2 0 0 1 , u n t i l A u g u s t 1 6 ,
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2001,
said
minor
ohild
resided
uith
the
Oefandant
and
the
I Defendant1*
mother
at
12214
Sherman
Drive,
Charlotte.
North
Carolina! that from Auguet 16, 2001, until December 10, 2001,
eaid minor child reeided with the Plaintiff, the Defendant and
the Defendant**
mother
at
1201
Alberto
Lane,
Stanley,
North
Carollnai that on Oecember 10, 2001, eaid minor child and the
Plaintiff went to the residence of the P l a i n t i f f s mother at 3600
Enfield Road, C h a r l o t t e , North
Carolina! that on Deoember
11,
2001, the
Defendant
took
eaid minor
child
to
reside
at
the
residence
of
the
Defendant1©
grandmother
at
6631
Candlowood
Drive, C h a r l o t t e , North Carolina; that eaid minor child continued
to reeide with the Defendant at eaid reeldence until on or about
January 4, 2002, w h e n , upon information and belief, the Defendant
once again took eaid minor ohild to the State of Utah, where the
Oefandant, upon information and belief, arranged
to give
said
minor
child
up
for
adoption,
without
the
coneent
of
the

Plaintiff.
7.
There have been no prior actions in this or any other
Jurisdiction concerning the custody of eaid minor child, save and
except for ona or more domestic violence aotlone filed in 2001 in
either Mecklenburg County and/or Qaeton County, North Carolina,
between
the
Plaintiff
and
the
Defendant,
wherein
temporary
custody of said m i n o r child was sought by the Defendant.
8.
The P l a i n t i f f knows of no one other than the Defendant
who is a real party in interest concerning the custody of eaid
minor ohild.
9.
Tha P l a i n t i f f is a fit and proper person to have the
primary c a r s , c u s t o d y , tuition and control of said minor child of
the p a r t i e s .
10.
It would be consistent
with the best interests of said
minor ohild of tha parties to be in the primary custody of the
Plaintiff. J
11.
For a variety of reasons, the Defendant is not
a fit
and proper person to have the cuetody of said minor child, most
demonstrably by reajeon of the faot that the Defendant has ©ought
to havs no further relationship with said minor ohild by giving
said minor child up for adoption in the State of Utah,
12.
Except for the fact that said minor child was actually
born In the State of Utah and that the Defendant approximately
one month ago took said minor ohild to the State of Utah to be
given
up
for
adoption,
neither
party
has
any
significant
connection with the State of Utah,
13.
It would be consistent with the best interests of said
minor ohild for the Plaintiff's paternity of eaid minor child to
[bo conclusively s e t a b l i s h s d via gsnstic testing.

23

WHEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF

RESPECTFULLY

PRAYS THE

COURTi

[1]
That the Plaintiff be awarded the primary
Kmnnmth Skylmr
B*kmrp I I I , born August 6, 2001 \

custody

of

[2]
That the court enter an order directing the parties to
• ubrnit
to
appropriate
genetic
teetlng
for
the
purpose
of
oonolueively eetabliehing the Plaintiff's paternity of eaid minor
child;
[3]
That the Court enter appropriate
of effectuating the return of said minor
North Carolina*

may

[4]
And for
eeem Juet and

euch other
proper.

and

further

ordere for the purpose
child to the State of

relief

ae

to

the

Court

RICHARD B. SCHULTZ
^
Attorney for the Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 1232
Qaetonia t North Carolina 28053
Telephonei (704) 866-8868
Telefax*
(704) 866-0196
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FRANK
EDWARD
O S B O R N E , JR.,
being
first
duly
eworn,
dapoaaa
and
eaye that
ha la
tha Plaintiff
in tho
foregoing
Complaint, and that am auch ha haa read tha oontanta tharaof and
knowa the aame to be true and correct of his own knowledge, save
and except aa to thoaa mattere therein allagad upon information
and b e l i e f , and aa to thoaa thing*, ha belieyee tbjMq to be true

^ ^ ^ J F R A N K

I] Mp^'M'^Xo
thia 'tfi»\

.yW/fSKY

and aubacribad
7

day

before

of February,

EDWARD

O S B O R N E , JR

ma
2002.

PU0LH

f*lif,i.C»ortmiaaion Expiree*

rf~4*G7
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GASTON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
Children & Family Services
330 N. Marietta St.
Gastonia, North Carolina 28052
(704) 862-7530 (704) 862-7898 - FAX

Keith A. Moon
Director

01-21-20^2
The Adoj [ion Center of Choice
241 West 521 N
Orem, U h 84057-4696

Re'

Birth Mother Angela Catherine Wilkinson Baker
Cnild - Kenneth Skyler 8aker (Also Known As Franklin Edward Osborne I I I )
D|te of Birth 08-06-2001
[I

Dear Sirs:
The adoption staff of our agency has had considerable contact recently with Frank Osborne who
states he k the biological father of the child named above. Apparently the birth mother lived with
Mr Osbortie here until she traveled to Utah to give birth. Her Initial intent was to surrender the baby
at birth (Mf- Osborne objected) |3Ut she did not and brought the child back to North Carolina with her
where sharnoved back in with Mr. Osborne and they parented the child together. Efforts to
legitimate |he baby were begun 'but when the birth mother had an argument with Mr Osborne, she
fled with tjje baby to Utah wher$ she surrendered the child for adoption to your agency She then
returned to North Carolina where she continues to reside
p
i

While In North Carolina, we understand that Ms Baker on multiple occasions and to a variety of
agencies presented Mr. Osborne as the child's biological father. We are exploring this further
He objectsflto any plans for his son to be adopted and is in the process of Initiating legal action to
that end. »•

1

We wantei to make sure you wqre informed of his opposition to the placement of this child into an
adoptive h me and his intent totexerciseparental rights and responsibilities towards this child We
definitely Uifee you to contact hirti and involve him in the planning process We have begun
addressing isome of our questions and concerns via the Interstate Services System.
Thank you

Sincerely,

Patricia L IHOVIS

Social Wor(| Supervisor I I I - Adoption Dlvi&on

cc.

Linaa Wrightson, Interstate Adoption Consultant
North Carolina Departmeht of Health and Human Services
Division of Social Services - ICPC Adoption Unit

GASTON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
Children & Family Services
330 N. Marietta St.
Gastonia, North Carolina 28052
(*04) 862-7530 (704) 862-7898 - FAX

Keith A. Moon
Director

01-23-2002

4

North rolina Department of Health and Human Services
DivisionJof Social Services- Interstate Adoptions
325 N |alisbury St.
2411 Mtfl Service Center
:
RaleighJ!NC 27699-2411
Attn: Linda Wrightson
Interstate Adoption Consultant

Re:

upild - Kenneth Skyler Baker (born 08-06-2001)
Mpther - Angela Catherine Wilkinson Baker
Father - Franklin Edward Osborne

Dear Ms ] Wrightson:
We wo ufa like to make yoq aware of a potential adoption situation which we feel
falls witHIn the jurisdiction of the Interstate Compact yet we are not aware of any
attempt^ at compliance. This case involves a North Carolina mother and child- In
the past jjnonth the mother took the child to Utah where she relinquished him for
adoption] jto The Adoption Renter of Choice. Upon doing so, she returned to North
Carolina The birth father fiere had been very involved with the mother and child,
However![she did not notlfyj him of her plans to surrender the child nor has the
agency ifl Utah involved him in the planning.
It is our contention that both mother and child have North Carolina residency thus to
ensure tttje safety and well being of the child, Interstate Services are needed.
In order |o give you Insight into this matter, we are providing a detailed written
report on the situation as Itl was brought to our attention. The birth mother is a legal
resident tyf Mecklenburg County, NC and the birth father resides in Gaston County,
NC.
|(

In addition, we want to inform you that a check of the North Carolina eligibility
system pone today confirms that Angela Baker has consistently received various
state public assistance benefits since 1999. Since it is a requirement that she be a
North Carolina resident to:be eligible, records confirm she has not terminated her
residency at any time.
jl
A furthet check revealed that Kenneth Skyler Baker has consistently received Work
First benefits as a North Carolina resident with an effective date of 08-06-01.
Currentw Angela Baker's assistance data shows that in January 2002 she is still
receiving Work First, Meditaid, and food stamps in North Carolina with Skyler shown
as a member of her household and a recipient of these programs as well. Due to
the fact Hs. Baker receive}? public assistance, she was required to sign sworn
affidavits naming Skyler's birth father. She did - Frank Osborne. This is entered in
the North Carolina state system.
is

Therefore we are asking that this case be brought into compliance with the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. We have seen nothing to indicate
this has been done to date\ Official North Carolina government files show Skyler as
a resident of our state thus placement across state lines should be under the
jurisdiction and directives of Interstate Services.
We appreciate your prompt attention to this matter, Questions, concerns, and
needs may be addressed to me at 704-862-7925.

Sincerely,

Patricia
Hovis
wji
Social
irk Supervisor I I I
Adoptiorj* Division

Case Regarding Kenneth Skvler- Born 08-06-2001
Date: 01-23-2002

Birth Ntother:

Angela C Baker
6331 Candlewood Dr.
Charlotte, NC 28210

Birth Father

Franklin E. Osborne
1201 Alberto Lane
Stanley, NC 28164

Introduction:

Our agei cy has had a number of contacts in January 2002 from a Gaston County
resident, Frank Osborne, vyho Is concerned over the fact that earlier this month, his
ex-g rlfri|nd, Angela Baker> took their infant son to Utah without his knowledge or
consent nd relinquished him for adoption. Mr. Osborne was in need of direction
and gui nee. He stats he' loves his son and does not agree with a plan of adoption,
We havejjencouraged him to contact an attorney about pursuing this legally. At the
same time we have some questions about how this potential adoption Is being
handled &nd about the need for ICPC intervention and jurisdiction.
In order :o determine the situation and circumstances that led to this point, we
asked Mi Osborne to provide us a chronology of his relationship with Ms. Baker
from thetjtime of Skyler's conception to the present and of how this relinquishment
in Utah come to be.
The following narrative documents what we have been advised in a series of
interview!.

Summa WFrank Os&orne and Angela Baker had an established boyfriend/girlfriend relationship
when My moved In together in 2000; this residence was in Mecklenburg County. It
was during this time of cohabitation that she became pregnant.
1 looking towards the future, purchased his current home in Gaston
Mr. Osbolne,
TC.
He and a pregnant Angela Baker moved in during January 2001.
County,
Ined
together throughout the pregnancy until just before the child was
ril-l!
They rerrjj
born.

According to Mr. Osborne; Ms. Baker has a history of mental problems. She has
participated in counseling through the local Mental Health Center and has been
hospita jzed for inpatient psychiatric care In the past.
As timejjfor the delivery drew near, Ms. Baker grew restless. Approximately two
weeks prior to Skyler's birth, she had Mr, Osborne arrested for Communicating
Threatswcharges since dismissed). He remained in Jail about three days before he
was able to post bond. During the time he was locked up, Ms. Baker took
furnishings from the house and moved in with her grandmother in Charlotte, NC.
This would have been during the last week In July/first week in August 2001.
Ms. Bak|r did not inform Mr. Osborne that she was considering adoption. Once she
gave birth, she called him to say she was in Utah where the baby had just been
delivered. She explained $he had contacted an adoption agency in Utah and after
consulti|g with them, she had gone there to deliver with plans to relinquish the child
for adoption. However once their son was bom, she changed her mind and did not
follow through.
During this conversation she told him she planned to name the baby Franklin
Edward Osborne I I I . This name appeared on some early paperwork but when she
actually Completed the birth certificate, she named him Kenneth Skyler Baker. His
birth certificate confirms h$ was bom at 9:48 pm on 08-06-2001 at Timpanogos
RegionajjHospital in Orem,;Utah.
Mr. Osb ne told her he wanted her and the baby to come home so they could live
as a faml y. They talked oyer their problems and mutually decided to reconcile. The
baby wa born the first part of the week; since she was not relinquishing, she and
the bab were sent home to North Carolina by bus and were back here by Friday of
the sam week. The bus trip was reportedly three days long thus despite Utah
being th place of the child's birth, he actually only lived there a couple days at
most, pr bably the length of the post-natal hospital stay. Ms. Baker did not
establish Sa residence in Uta!h.
Upon the r return to North Carolina on or about 08-10-2001, Ms. Baker and Skyler
moved b|ck into the Gastoin County residence of Mr. Osborne. Also residing there
were MsJiBaker's older son iand her mother. During this time, she presented Skyler
as the sojji of Mr. Osborne and received public assistance for herself and both sons.
ji
;
They continued to live together until approximately 12-10-2001. They had an
argument on that date which resulted In Ms. Baker slashing his tires. Law
enforcement officers advised him take the baby and leave home to provide her with
some "cofcl down" time. HQ did so and went to his mother's home In Mecklenburg
County. Around 3:00 am officers came there to arrest him; Ms. Baker had again
charged liim with Communicating Threats. When he was taken to jail, Ms. Baker
came to tfie home and took Skyler.

Apparently some sort of restraining order was also issued pending a hearing
becaus^Ms, Baker continued to live In Mr. Osborne's Gaston County home with the
baby whSie Mr.Osborne stayed with his mother in Charlotte.

8
They nej^er reunited as a couple following the December 2001 break up but were
able to establish some lev^l of rapport. On at least five different dates between
December 12 and 23, she brought Skyler to visit Mr. Osborne. She was then living
in Mecklenburg County with her sons.
She wasijscheduled to brinp Skyler to visit Mr. Osborne on December 28, However
she calle|j him to cancel stating there had been a death in the family so she had to
change ner plans; Caller 10 showed this call was made from her grandmother's
Mecklenpurg County, NC home.
The nextj information Mr.Osborne received regarding his son came from a mutual
friend who called on 01-05J-2002 to inform him that Ms, Baker had gone to Utah and
surrendered Skyler for adoption to an agency there. Desperate, Mr. Osborne and
his mothfcr made multiple calls to Utah trying to locate her and/or the agency
involved!
|

Finally on) 01-06-2002 theyjfound the motel where she stayed while surrendering
Skyler but were told she held just checked out On 01-07-2002, they saw her here
in North tarolina. She is staying at her grandmother's home in Charlotte, NC.
Mr. Osbope last saw her approximately 01-20-2002 when the two were In court
regarding charges they had taken out These were dismissed. Apparently both
parties have taken out assarted charges on each other. All but one taken out by Ms,
Baker aglinst Mr. Osborne have been dismissed and that one is not scheduled for a
hearing ijntll the end of thi$ month.
With Internet assistance antf a lot of persistence, Mr, Osborne located the adoption
agency involved in this surrender - The Adoption Center of Choice in Orem, Utah,
Reported\y officials there told him he essentially had no parental rights and was
"only onalof three" possibilities as the birth father. They have initiated no efforts to
contact op involve him at arjy time in the planning for his son.
When we( Iquizzed him about the paternity issue, he stated he has no doubts that he
is the fat r of Skyler. He was living with Angela Baker before conception, at
concepti , and until the end of the pregnancy. He said she was not involved with
other me during that time and has said this now in an effort to hamper his ability
to stop t adoption.
Frank Os rne states he is committed to providing for his son and does not want
him place|jl for adoption, Mr, Osborne's mother has expressed her support for her
son's effonts , her Jove for h^r grandson, and her willingness to help in any way.

ii
Verifications

A check pf agency files and the North Carolina Division of Social Services' statewide
eliglb it* computer system! confirms that Angela Baker and her sons, Donny and
Kenneth- Skyler Baker, are [listed as North Carolina residents and all are currently
included In open state public assistance programs at this time.
Amgela Baker has received various forms of public assistance in North
Carolina since years; before Skyler's conception. There has been no break in
h$r state residency.;
Currently she receives Work First money payments, Medicaid, and food
imps through Medklenburg County DSS.
S|e was a recipient pf public assistance in NC when she went to Utah to
driver Skyler. She did not change her residency to Utah and there was no
gap in coverage.
Slj^ler Is included in ithe Work First, Medicaid, and food stamp program grants
aaja member of Angela Baker's household. He has received these benefits
consistently since his birth on 08-06-2001. As of 01-23-2002 he Is still shown
asllan open case In Mecklenburg County.
| documents filed with the state of North Carolina as a requirement of the
!$ governing publlb assistance, Angela Baker has signed sworn documents
|t Frank Osborne ik the birth father of Kenneth Skyler Baker. She listed no
ottier possible fathers.
ler received Immqinizations through the Gaston County (NC) Health
[bailment from 08414-01 through 12-31-01. We have a copy of this record
file.

Recommendations:

We belie
Carolina
Utah or tl
the week

that even though Skyler was born in Utah, his legal residence is in North
"here is no indication his mother ever intended to establish residency in
Jt she ever lost custody of him prior to her return to NC with him during
if his birth.

There is documented proof that Skyler resided with his mother and half-brother in
North Carolina from August £001 until January 2002. During that time, there is
official documentation that Angela Baker presented him as a resident of North

t o

Carolinaland signed paternity affidavits naming Frank Osborne as his birth father
with no ifcther possibilities hamed.
Therefotb we feel that thej placement of this child across state lines for adoption,
while a legal option for thej mother, Is a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Compact for Placement of Children since Skyler is a North Carolina
resident With planned placement in Utah.
We ask that the North Carolina ICPC office pursue this to insure legal compliance,
protectiqp of all parties' rights, and the well being of Kenneth Skyler Baker.

Prepared by:

Patricia 1| Hovis
Social Wflrk Supervisor I I I
i
Gaston Qbunty Department of Social Services AdoDtion Program
330 N. Marietta Street
GastoniajlNC 28052
ji
01-23-20f>2
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Pauiette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

Frank Osborne,
Petitioner,

ORDER

v.
Case No.
Adoption Center of Choice, a
Utah Corporation, John Doe and
Jane Doe, Adoptive Parents,
Respondents.
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JUL 0 5 2002
HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme,
This case is before the court on a petition for
extraordinary relief. Petitioner seeks relief in the form of:
1) a writ of mandamus against every district court in the state
to prevent the finalization of the adoption scheduled for
sometime after July 4, 2002; 2) an order to compel the adoption
agency to reveal the identity of the adoptive parents; and 3)
an order to allow the petitioner, alleging he is the biological
father, to intervene in the adoption without waiving his
objection to personal jurisdiction.
11

[I] n the case of unmarried father, a biological
relationship alone is insufficient to establish
constitutionally protected parental rights." In re Adoption of
B.B.D, 1999 UT 70,1(10, 984 P.2d 967 (citing Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 257-60, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983)). Utah statutes
governing the rights of an unmarried, biological father are
self-operative. "When an illegitimate child is relinquished by
its mother, the rights of the father are automatically
terminated unless he has previously filed an acknowledgment of
paternity." Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 640
(Utah 1990).
In order to preserve his rights, an unmarried
father must: 1) initiate a proceeding to establish paternity;
2) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings;
and 3) pay a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses
incurred by the pregnancy, if he had actual knowledge of it.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2) (b) (Supp. 2001) ; see also In
re Adoption of B.B.D, 1999 UT 70 at ^16. If an unmarried
father fails to "fully and strictly comply" with all of these
conditions before the mother relinquishes the child for
adoption, he "is deemed to have waived and surrendered any
right in relation to the child, including the right to notice
of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of
the child, and his consent to the adoption is not required."
Id. 78-30-4.14(5) . Petitioner has failed to establish he has

met any of these requirements. He knew that the mother had
given birth in Utah. Thereafter, the mother and child returned
to North Carolina and temporarily resided with Petitioner.
Nonetheless, Petitioner never took any legal action in either
Utah or North Carolina to preserve his rights in the child.
The Legislature has seen fit to offer additional
protections to unmarried biological fathers residing in another
state. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15.(4) provides:
The Legislature finds that an unmarried
biological father who resides in another
state may not, in every circumstance, be
reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly
comply with, the requirements of this
chapter. Therefore when all of the following
requirements have been met, that unmarried
biological father may contest an adoption,
prior to the finalization of the decree of
adoption, and assert his interest in the
child; the court may then, in its discretion,
proceed with an evidentiary hearing under
Subsection 78-30-4.16(2):

(d) the unmarried biological father has
complied with the most stringent and complete
requirements of the state where the mother
previously resided or was located, in order
to protect and preserve his parental interest
and right in the child in cases of adoption.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15 (4) (d) . In this case, Petitioner
clearly fails to meet at least the requirement under subsection
(d), because he took absolutely no legal action in his home state
of North Carolina for the five months prior to the mother's
relinquishment. Petitioner has simply failed to take any timely
action to preserve his rights to this child.
Regarding Petitioner's jurisdictional argument, the question
of personal jurisdiction only arises when a defendant is called
to defend an action in court. The district court did not need or
attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction over Petitioner. He
lost his rights to the child by operation of law when he failed
to take the statutory steps required to protect his rights. See
Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d at 640. Furthermore, it
is Petitioner, as a plaintiff, seeking relief in Utah courts who
has invoked the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. The fact that
court action, and the operation of law, affected the father's
unprotected parental rights does not implicate personal
jurisdiction. If Petitioner wants to protect and assert his
20020489-CA

2

rights in a child relinquished for adoption in Utah, he must take
the necessary action to protect his rights under Utah law. He
cannot simply stand on the "sidelines" and claim that Utah courts
lack jurisdiction over him. See In re Adoption of B.B.D. 1999 UT
70 at ^29.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ of mandamus
and temporary restraining order are denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent's request for attorney
fees and costs is denied.
DATED this

2

day of July, 2002.

FOR.T~HE~€PURT:
)

7&»

Jajrtec Z. Davi

20020489-CA
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of Kenneth Skyler Baker, m,

A person under 18 years.

)
1

ORDER REGARDING BIRTH
FATHER'S RIGHTS

]
)

Probate No. 022400054

This matter came before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for Determination of
Birth Father Rights filed March 8, 2002. Based upon this Court's Memorandum Decision dated
March 29, 2002,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED, that pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5), any person, including Frank Osborne, claiming to be the putative natural
father of the minor child is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the

minor child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the
adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required.
DATED this Sfday of April, 2002.
BY THE COURT:

Steven L. Hansen, Judge, I ;... ^
Fourth Judicial District Coart*^,.^
**** net"*/'
SAWPDATA\PLEADING\ADOFnON CENTER3AKER.ORDER RE BIRTH FATHER RIGHTS.wpd
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